UAMY — United States Antimony Corporation
Identity
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Full legal name | United States Antimony Corporation (d/b/a USAC) |
| Ticker | UAMY |
| Exchange | NYSE (uplisted from NYSE American on March 11, 2026) |
| Sector | Materials / Diversified Metals & Mining (GICS) |
| Founded | 1968 by John C. Lawrence |
| HQ | Dallas, Texas (relocated from Thompson Falls, MT in January 2025) |
| Operations | Thompson Falls, Montana (flagship smelter); Madero, Mexico; Preston, Idaho (zeolite) |
| Employees | ~50-75 (growing with expansion) |
| Website | usantimony.com |
| Market cap | ~$1.28B (as of March 2026) |
| Shares outstanding | ~140M |
| Enterprise value | ~$1.26B |
Thesis
The Bull Case
UAMY is the only antimony smelter in the Western Hemisphere at the exact moment China has cut off antimony exports to the US. With $597M+ in contracted revenue (DLA, commercial, DPA), a 6x smelter expansion completing April 2026, and the first domestic antimony mining in 40 years, the company is transitioning from a $15M/year processor to a $125M+ vertically integrated critical minerals producer.
The setup is genuinely rare:
- Sole-source monopoly — only operating antimony smelter in North America, with no competitor within 3 years of production
- Government backing — $245M DLA sole-source contract, $27M DPA Title III award, Gen. Jack Keane on the board
- Structural supply shock — China's Aug 2024 export controls and Dec 2024 ban on US exports are geopolitical strategy, not temporary market action
- Antimony prices 5-7x historical average — $37,000-51,500/t vs. $5,000-8,000/t pre-2024
- Defense irreplaceability — antimony trisulfide is non-substitutable in 300+ munition types; the US military literally cannot make ammunition without it
The Bear Case
The stock already prices in the bull case. At $1.28B market cap on $40M trailing revenue with negative earnings, you're paying for perfection.
- Governance is objectively terrible — ISS QualityScore 10/10 (worst possible). CEO Gary Evans has a bankruptcy and SEC Wells Notice in his past, simultaneously runs two other public companies, and the board includes a psychiatrist
- Execution risk is real — $125M guidance for 2026 is a 3x jump requiring flawless Thompson Falls expansion. Q3 2025 was a 32% revenue miss
- Dilution machine — shares doubled from 66M to 140M since 2015, $400M ATM shelf active, SBC exploded 10x to $4.69M in 9 months
- China policy reversal — if China lifts export controls (review date Nov 2026), antimony prices crash and the entire Western thesis collapses
- Customer concentration — DLA represents ~60%+ of projected revenue
Strategic Mineral Angle
Antimony sits at the intersection of defense, energy transition, and great-power competition. The US consumes ~25,000 tonnes annually, produces essentially zero domestically, and holds just 1,100 tonnes in the national defense stockpile — 18 days of supply. China controls ~48% of mine production and ~80% of smelting/refining. Russia adds ~25%. Before UAMY restarted Thompson Falls, the US had zero domestic smelting capacity.
This isn't a commodity play. It's a national security play with commodity economics.
Conviction & Sizing
Conviction: Low-Medium. The asset is compelling; the operator and valuation are not.
Position size: 1-3% of portfolio maximum. This is a speculative position in a binary outcome company. Scale in on weakness — the stock traded $5-$19 in the past 6 months.
Target price: Scenario-dependent. Base case ($125M rev, 25% EBITDA margin, 20x EV/EBITDA) = ~$625M EV, roughly $4.50/share. Bull case gets you to current levels. Bear case is ~$1/share.
Expected holding period: 12-24 months (tactical, not permanent).
Business
What They Do
UAMY is the only fully integrated antimony company in the Western Hemisphere. They mine, mill, smelt, and sell antimony products — oxide, metal, and trisulfide — plus a zeolite side business and a newly acquired tungsten property. Think of them as America's sole domestic antimony processor at a time when China just cut off supply.
Business model: Primarily a smelter/processor. Historically they bought antimony ore from third-party suppliers globally, processed it at Thompson Falls (Montana) and Madero (Mexico), and sold finished antimony products to US industrial and defense customers. Now pivoting to vertically integrated mine-to-market with own domestic ore supply from Montana and Alaska.
Business Segments
- US Antimony Operations (~75% of revenue) — Thompson Falls smelter (flagship)
- Mexican Antimony Operations (~15%) — Madero smelter + Puerto Blanco mill + mines
- Precious Metals Recovery (~2-3%) — Gold/silver byproduct from antimony processing
- US Zeolite Operations (~8-10%) — Bear River Zeolite, Preston, Idaho (400+ year reserve life)
Revenue Trajectory
| Period | Revenue | YoY Growth |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | $11.0M | +42.6% |
| FY2023 | $8.7M | -21.3% |
| FY2024 | $14.9M | +71.8% |
| 9M 2025 | $26.2M | +182% vs 9M 2024 |
| FY2025E | $39-43M | ~164% |
| FY2026E | $125M | ~218% |
Products
| Product | Revenue Share | Description | Key Buyer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antimony Trioxide (ATO) | Largest | White powder, flame retardant synergist | Industrial fabric manufacturers, plastics companies |
| Antimony Metal | Growing fast | Refined ingots (99.5%+ purity) | DLA for national stockpile, battery alloy makers |
| Antimony Trisulfide | Small but strategic | Black powder for ammunition primers | US military (sole domestic supplier) |
| Zeolite | ~$2.65M (9M 2025) | Soil amendment, water filtration, CattleMax feed additive | Agriculture, water treatment |
| Precious Metals | Small | Gold/silver byproduct from antimony processing | Spot market |
Key Contracts & Awards
| Contract | Counterparty | Value | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA IDIQ | Defense Logistics Agency | Up to $245M / 5yr | Awarded; first $10M delivery order placed Sep 2025 |
| Commercial supply | US industrial fabric manufacturer | $106.7M / 5yr | Executed Nov 2025 |
| DPA Title III | Department of War | $27M | Awarded Mar 5, 2026 |
| Perpetua testing | Perpetua Resources (PPTA) | TBD | Active metallurgical testing agreement |
| Americas Gold & Silver JV | AG&S | TBD | Hydromet processing (Bolivia), announced Feb 2026 |
Total contracted/awarded revenue: $597M+
Perpetua Resources Partnership — The Long Game
UAMY has a metallurgical testing agreement with Perpetua Resources (PPTA), testing antimony concentrate from Perpetua's Stibnite Gold Project in Idaho. That project contains 148M lbs antimony reserve — one of the largest deposits outside China. The goal: evaluate production of military-spec antimony trisulfide for munitions.
If Stibnite goes into production (~2028-2029), UAMY would be the natural processing partner as the only domestic smelter. This transforms a potential competitor into a toll-processing customer. The Perpetua relationship is worth watching as a medium-term revenue catalyst — it could double UAMY's ore throughput without capital risk.
Assets & Operations
Thompson Falls Smelter (Montana) — Flagship
- Only operating antimony smelter in the United States
- Current capacity: ~80-100 tons/month (pre-expansion)
- 6x expansion underway: WSP USA Inc. contracted to expand to 400-500 tons/month
- CapEx budget: <$15M
- Completion target: early April 2026
- $27M DPA Title III award to modernize and expand
- Produces: antimony oxide, antimony metal ingots, antimony trisulfide, refined gold/silver
Stibnite Hill Mine (Montana)
- Adjacent to Thompson Falls smelter — historically mined 1969-1983
- Montana DEQ approval received October 2, 2025
- ~800 tons of antimony ore removed to date
- 102 federal mining claims staked covering vein extensions
- First domestic antimony mining in the US in ~40 years
- Triggered the $25M upward revision in FY2026 guidance (from $100M to $125M)
Madero Smelter (Coahuila, Mexico)
- 16-acre property with 17 small + 4 large rotating furnaces
- Capacity: ~200 tons/month
- Shut down March 2024, restarted January 2025 due to surging antimony prices
- Produces crude oxide and crude metal shipped to Montana for finishing
Alaska Claims — Future Domestic Supply
- 17,900 acres via exclusive option agreement (120 state mining claims)
- Additional 144 claims covering ~8,998 acres in Fairbanks area
- DPA Title III funds partly earmarked for Alaska extraction
- Summer 2025 exploration planned; near-surface deposits prioritized
Bear River Zeolite (Preston, Idaho)
- Operating since 2000 as wholly owned subsidiary
- Mines and processes clinoptilolite zeolite
- Reserve life: 400+ years
- Revenue: ~$2.65M for 9M 2025 (up 16% YoY)
- Small but steady cash-flow contributor
Other
- Puerto Blanco Mill (Guanajuato, Mexico) — gravity and flotation mill, cyanide leach plant under construction
- Mexican Mines: Los Juarez (active), Soyatal (active), Wadley (option)
- Radersburg flotation facility (Montana) — acquired Jan 2026 for $4.75M, feeds into Montana/Alaska mining ramp
Value Chain Position
ORE SUPPLY PROCESSING END MARKETS
----------- ---------- -----------
Montana mine (own) ->
Alaska (future, own) -> Thompson Falls -> Finished Sb oxide -> Flame retardants
Mexico mines (own) -> smelter (ONLY US) -> Finished Sb metal -> DLA / Defense
3rd party global -> Madero smelter (MX) -> Finished Sb trisulfide -> Ammunition
Bolivia (hydromet) -> Gold/silver byproduct -> Refiners
Bear River Zeolite -> BRZ Processing -> Zeolite products -> Agriculture/water
(Idaho, own)
UAMY is the bottleneck. You can mine antimony anywhere, but if you want to process it in North America, it goes through UAMY's two smelters. There is no alternative. This gives them extraordinary pricing power and strategic value.
First Principles: What Is Antimony?
Antimony (Sb, atomic number 51) is a silvery-white metalloid in Group 15 of the periodic table. Brittle in pure form but incredibly useful when alloyed or converted to compounds.
Primary ore mineral: Stibnite (Sb2S3) — antimony trisulfide, a steel-gray mineral. This is what you find in the ground.
The problem being solved: The US consumes ~25,000 tonnes annually and produces essentially zero. China controls ~48% of mine production and ~80% of smelting/refining. Russia and Tajikistan add another ~40%. So ~90% of global supply comes from adversarial or unreliable sources. The national defense stockpile holds just 1,100 tonnes — 18 days of supply. Antimony trisulfide is the primary compound in ammunition primers, used in 200+ types of munitions with no viable substitute. Without antimony, the US military cannot produce ammunition.
Key applications: Flame retardants (~48%), lead-acid batteries (~33%), ammunition/defense (~8%), semiconductors (~5%), other (~6%).
Key technical metrics:
- Purity: Commercial metal 99.5-99.65%, high-purity 99.9%+
- Throughput: Measured in tons/month at smelter (UAMY targeting 400-500 t/mo from ~80 t/mo)
- Recovery rate: Gravity separation 65-80%, flotation 85-95%
- Grade: Economically viable >2% for large deposits, >25% for direct shipping ore
Antimony Supply Chain Economics
The 4-Stage Value Chain
Antimony production follows a clear pipeline: Mine -> Concentrate -> Smelt/Refine -> Fabricate. Smelters sit at the highest-margin bottleneck — with concentrate costing ~$35,000/t and refined metal selling at $58,000-60,000/t, gross margins of $7,000-9,000/t (12-15%) are achievable before overhead. At current elevated Sb prices, the margins are even wider.
Stage 1: Mining (Upstream)
Extract stibnite (Sb2S3) ore from the ground.
- Ore grade matters enormously: <5% Sb = uneconomic, 5-25% = requires concentration, 25-40% = direct smelt-ready, 45-60% = premium
- Mining cost: $30-80/t ore (varies by method, depth, location)
Stage 2: Concentration (Beneficiation)
Upgrade ore from mine grade (~2-10% Sb) to concentrate grade (45-60% Sb). Grinding to <0.074mm (200 mesh), then gravity separation (jigs, shaking tables — exploits Sb's high density of 6.7 g/cm3), then flotation (xanthate collectors + pine oil frother to float stibnite), then dewatering.
- Recovery rate: 85-92% (gravity + flotation combined)
- Concentration ratio: 10:1 to 20:1
- Processing cost: $15-30/t ore processed
Concentrate specifications for sale:
| Spec | Premium Grade | Standard Grade | Low Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sb content | >=55% | 45-55% | 25-45% |
| Arsenic | <0.3% | <0.5% | <1.0% |
| Lead | <0.4% | <0.8% | <1.5% |
| Marketability | Highly sought | Standard | Discounted |
Stage 3: Smelting & Refining — THE VALUE BOTTLENECK
Convert concentrate into refined antimony metal or antimony trioxide. Two main routes:
Route A: Volatilization Roasting -> Reduction (most common in China)
- Roasting (850-1,000C): Sb2S3 + O2 -> Sb2O3 (gaseous) + SO2
- Condensation: Sb2O3 fume collected as fine white powder (crude ATO)
- Reduction (1,200-1,300C): Sb2O3 + C -> Sb metal + CO2
- Refining: Alkaline flux removes impurities -> 99.65%+ Sb
Route B: Direct Reduction with Iron (traditional, used by UAMY)
- Direct smelting: Sb2S3 + Fe -> Sb metal + FeS (slag)
- Refining: Repeated fluxing
- Casting: Pour into ingot molds (25 kg standard)
Route C: Hydrometallurgical (UAMY's new approach for some feed)
- Alkaline sulfide or acid leach to dissolve Sb from ore
- Electrowinning: Plate out pure Sb metal
- Advantage: works with complex/mixed ores, lower emissions
Smelter Unit Economics (per tonne of refined Sb metal)
| Cost Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Concentrate purchase (50% grade) | $35,090 |
| Iron/carbon reductant | $135 |
| Fluxes, fuel, electricity | $160-310 |
| Flotation reagents | $55 |
| Labor, G&A, compliance | $3,000-5,000 |
| All-in production cost | ~$38,500-40,600 |
| Revenue (refined Sb metal) | $58,000-60,000 |
| Gross margin per tonne | $17,400-21,500 (~30-36%) |
Chinese vs. Western Smelter Economics
| Factor | Chinese Smelter | Western Smelter (UAMY) |
|---|---|---|
| Concentrate cost | ~$6,760/t (domestic supply) | ~$15,950/t (import) |
| All-in production cost | ~$16,000/t | ~$38,500-40,600/t |
| Selling price | ~$26,000/t (China domestic) | $58,000-60,000/t (US/EU) |
| Gross margin | ~$10,000/t (~38%) | ~$17,400-21,500/t (~30-36%) |
The China-to-US arbitrage is enormous — $22,679/t EXW China vs. $65,100/t Baltimore represents a 187% markup. UAMY benefits directly from this spread as the only US smelter.
Conversion factors:
- Stibnite ore (Sb2S3): 71.7% Sb by weight
- ATO (Sb2O3): 83.5% Sb by weight
- Sodium antimonate (NaSbO3): 56.1% Sb by weight
- Typical smelting recovery: ~90%. Roasting to ATO: ~95%+ recovery.
Stage 4: Downstream Fabrication & Products
Refined antimony metal or crude ATO is converted into specialty products:
| Process | Input | Output | End Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oxidation (500-800C) | Sb metal | Antimony trioxide (Sb2O3) | Flame retardants |
| Alloying | Sb metal + Pb | Lead-antimony alloy (1-6% Sb) | Batteries, ammunition |
| Sulfiding | Sb metal + S | Antimony trisulfide (Sb2S3) | Ammunition primers |
| Oxidation (sodium) | Sb2O3 + NaOH | Sodium antimonate (NaSbO3) | Glass fining (solar) |
| Crystal growth | High-purity Sb + In/Ga | InSb / GaSb wafers | IR sensors, semiconductors |
The Vertical Integration Story
This is the margin catalyst. Every tonne of concentrate UAMY mines itself instead of purchasing saves ~$8,000-11,000/t in input costs, flowing directly to gross margin. As UAMY brings its own mines online (Alaska, Montana), it replaces purchased concentrate ($15,950/t) with self-mined ore at ~$5,000-8,000/t all-in mining + concentration cost, potentially doubling gross margin per tonne.
UAMY VALUE CHAIN (current -> target state)
UPSTREAM MIDSTREAM DOWNSTREAM CUSTOMER
AK mines ---+
MT mines ---+ Thompson Falls, MT Sb Metal -----------> DLA (stockpile)
Bolivia ---+--> SMELTER & REFINERY --> ATO ----------------> Industrial (FR)
Mexico ---+ Madero, Mexico Sb2S3 -------------> Ammunition mfrs
Purchased ---+ (Bolivia hydromet) NaSbO3 ------------> Glass/solar
concentrate Precious metals ---> Spot market
Current state: ~80% purchased concentrate, 20% own-mine
Target state: ~60% own-mine, 40% purchased (by 2027)
Follow the Bottleneck — How to Analyze the Antimony Supply Chain
The supply chain has three structural bottlenecks:
Bottleneck 1: Mine supply (geological scarcity). Global mine production ~100,000t Sb/yr. China at 48% and declining (Xikuangshan depleting, quotas tightening). Very few new Western mines in pipeline. Track USGS data, Chinese mining quota announcements, new project timelines.
Bottleneck 2: Smelting capacity (processing choke point). China controls ~80% of smelting. Export controls restrict refined Sb outflow. Western capacity: essentially just UAMY + Campine (recycled). Track smelter utilization rates, new capacity announcements, Thompson Falls expansion.
Bottleneck 3: Specialty product conversion (value-add). Weapons-grade Sb2S3 has very few qualified suppliers. Ultra-fine ATO is premium-priced with high barriers. Sodium antimonate for solar glass is niche but growing. Track defense procurement, solar installation rates, FR regulation changes.
Key Supply Chain Ratios
| Ratio | What It Measures | UAMY Benchmark |
|---|---|---|
| Concentrate-to-metal spread | Smelter margin health | $22,000-25,000/t (currently very wide) |
| China EXW vs. Baltimore price | Arbitrage / supply restriction severity | 187% premium (extreme) |
| Gross margin % | Operational efficiency | 28% (9M 2025), expanding |
| Vertical integration % | How much ore from own mines | Currently ~20%, target 60% by 2027 |
| DLA contract utilization | Revenue visibility | $10M first order on $245M ceiling |
| Capacity utilization | Throughput vs. nameplate | Expanding to 400-500 t/month |
Supply Chain Risk Assessment
| Risk | Impact | Probability |
|---|---|---|
| China lifts export controls | Sb price crashes 30-50%, margin compression | Low (15%) near-term |
| Southeast Asia capacity ramp | Gradual price normalization | Medium (50%) over 2-3 years |
| Substitution (non-halogen FR) | ATO demand erosion | Low-medium, very slow |
| Recycling growth | Secondary supply increases | Medium, structural trend |
| New Western mines (Perpetua) | More domestic supply, less scarcity premium | Medium (40%) by 2028+ |
Product Catalog & ASPs
| Product | Grade | Current ASP | Gross Margin Est. | Primary End Use |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sb Metal Ingot | 99.65% min | $58,000-60,000/t | 30-36% | Batteries, alloys, ordnance |
| Sb Metal Ingot | 99.85%+ (high purity) | $62,000-68,000/t | 35-40% | Electronics, specialty alloys |
| Antimony Trioxide (ATO) | Technical grade | $34,000-48,000/t | 25-35% | Flame retardants |
| ATO | Ultra-fine / nano-grade | $55,000-70,000/t | 40-50% | High-performance FR |
| Antimony Trisulfide (Sb2S3) | Weapons-grade | $65,000-80,000/t (est.) | 40-55% | Ammunition primers |
| Sodium Antimonate (NaSbO3) | Glass-grade | $40,000-55,000/t | 30-40% | Solar glass fining |
Regional ASPs (Sb Metal 99.65%, Feb 2026)
| Location | Price |
|---|---|
| EXW China | $22,679/t (lowest — domestic) |
| FOB China | $33,383/t (export) |
| Warehouse Rotterdam | $29,417/t (European delivery) |
| Warehouse Baltimore | ~$65,100/t ($29.56/lb — US delivery, highest) |
| Port India | ~$34,600/t |
Key Supply Chain Players
Upstream (Miners):
- Hsikwangshan Twinkling Star (China, ~25,000t/yr) — world's largest, vertically integrated
- TALCO / Anzob mine (Tajikistan, ~18,000t/yr) — second-largest globally
- GeoProMining (Russia, ~8,000t/yr) — Sarylakh/Sentachan mines
- Perpetua Resources (PPTA, USA) — Stibnite Gold Project, Idaho; pre-production, ~2028-2029
- Mandalay Resources (MND.TO, Australia) — Costerfield mine, ~3,000t/yr
Midstream (Smelters):
- Hsikwangshan Twinkling Star (China, ~30,000t/yr capacity)
- Hunan Chenzhou Mining (China, ~15,000t/yr)
- UAMY (USA, ~5,000-6,000t/yr, expanding) — only North American smelter
- Campine (Belgium, ~8,000t/yr) — recycled feed only
- AMG Advanced Metallurgical (Netherlands, ~5,000t/yr)
Antimony Demand Analysis
Global Demand Breakdown
Total global antimony consumption: ~160,000 tonnes (2023 est.)
| End Use | Share (%) | Tonnes (est.) | Primary Compound |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flame retardants | 43-49% | ~70,000-80,000 | Antimony trioxide (ATO, Sb2O3) |
| Lead-acid batteries | 32% | ~51,000 | Antimonial lead alloy |
| Lead alloys (non-battery) | 14% | ~22,000 | Antimony metal |
| PET catalysts | 6% | ~10,000 | Antimony trioxide |
| Glass & ceramics (incl. solar) | ~4% | ~6,000-8,000 | Sodium antimonate |
| Ammunition & military | ~2-3% | ~3,000-5,000 | Sb metal (alloy), Sb2S3 (primers) |
| Semiconductors / IR optics | <1% | ~500-1,000 | InSb, GaSb (III-V compounds) |
1. Flame Retardants (43-49% of global demand)
ATO alone is not a flame retardant. It reacts in situ with halogenated compounds during combustion to form antimony oxyhalides — heavy vapor-phase radical scavengers that suppress flame propagation. Always paired with a halogen source (typically brominated or chlorinated FR).
Loading rates by substrate:
| Material | ATO Loading (wt%) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Plastics (general) | 2-5% | Standard synergist loading |
| Wire & cable insulation (PVC) | 3-8% | Higher loads for fire-safety rated cables |
| Electronics housings | 3-6% | PCB enclosures, connectors, server chassis |
| Textiles (back-coating) | 8-15% | Applied as dispersion in binder |
| Carpet backing | 5-10% | Building code compliance |
| Rigid foam insulation | 2-4% | Construction panels |
Demand math example: A data center using 500 tonnes of PVC cable insulation at 5% ATO loading consumes 25 tonnes of ATO, containing ~21 tonnes of antimony metal equivalent (Sb is 83.5% of Sb2O3 by weight).
Plastics account for 56% of ATO consumption. Electronics represent 19%. Data center build-out (AI infrastructure) is a material growth vector — wire/cable for data centers is a significant emerging demand driver. This is the tonnage story — secular growth driven by fire codes, plastics growth, and data centers.
Risks to demand: Substitution by non-halogenated FR systems (aluminum hydroxide, magnesium hydroxide) that don't require Sb synergist. EU regulatory pressure on ATO (REACH classification). Nano-ATO efficiency gains (9% lower loadings). These are real but slow-moving.
2. Lead-Acid Batteries (32% of demand)
Antimony hardens lead grids, improves castability, and enhances deep-cycle performance.
Sb content by battery type:
| Battery Type | Grid Alloy Sb Content | Total Battery Weight | Est. Sb Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| Automotive SLI (modern, maintenance-free) | 0.5-1.5% | 12-18 kg | 30-100 g |
| Automotive SLI (traditional flooded) | 2.5-4.5% | 12-18 kg | 150-400 g |
| Industrial traction (forklift) | 4.5-6.0% | 500-2,500 kg | 10-60 kg |
| Stationary / telecom backup | 3.0-6.0% | 50-500 kg | 0.6-12 kg |
| Deep-cycle (solar off-grid) | 3.0-5.0% | 20-60 kg | 0.3-1.2 kg |
Modern automotive batteries have shifted to lead-calcium grids with minimal or zero antimony — reducing per-unit intensity. But industrial/traction batteries still use Sb-alloy grids for cycling durability, and the installed base of flooded lead-acid globally remains enormous. EVs still use 12V Pb-acid auxiliary batteries currently.
3. Military Ammunition — Strategically Irreplaceable
Antimony enters ammunition in two distinct paths:
Path A: Bullet Core (lead-antimony hardened alloy, 0.5-3% Sb for military spec, up to 6% for civilian hard-cast)
| Caliber | Bullet Weight | Lead Core (est.) | Sb % in Alloy | Sb per Round |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.56x45mm (M193) | 3.6 g | ~2.5 g | 1.5-2.0% | 0.04-0.05 g |
| 7.62x51mm (M80) | 9.5 g | ~6.5 g | 1.5-2.0% | 0.10-0.13 g |
| .50 BMG (M33) | 46.0 g | ~38 g | 1.5-2.0% | 0.57-0.76 g |
| 9mm (M882) | 7.5 g | ~5.5 g | 1.5-2.0% | 0.08-0.11 g |
Note: The Army's newer M855A1 "Enhanced Performance Round" replaced lead-antimony with copper/bismuth-tin, eliminating Sb. But older M855 stocks remain massive and most allied nations still use lead-core rounds.
Path B: Primer Compound (antimony trisulfide, Sb2S3, 5-10% of primer charge weight)
Small rifle primers contain ~2 mg Sb2S3 (~1.4 mg Sb metal equivalent). The bullet core dominates antimony consumption per round — primers are negligible individually but significant at scale.
Total Sb per round (core + primer):
| Caliber | Sb in Core | Sb in Primer | Total Sb |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.56mm M193 | ~45 mg | ~1.4 mg | ~46 mg |
| 7.62mm M80 | ~115 mg | ~2.0 mg | ~117 mg |
| .50 BMG M33 | ~660 mg | ~2.8 mg | ~663 mg |
Aggregate military demand:
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Lake City (US) small-cal capacity | 1.6 billion rounds/year |
| US military share of Lake City | ~85% = 1.36 billion rounds |
| Weighted avg Sb per round (5.56/7.62 mix) | ~60-80 mg |
| Antimony for Lake City military output | ~80-110 tonnes/year |
| Total US military (all sources, all calibers) | ~150-250 tonnes Sb/year (peacetime) |
| Wartime multiplier | 3-5x (historical) |
| Wartime US military Sb demand | ~500-1,000 tonnes/year |
| Global military (peacetime) | ~1,000-3,000 tonnes/year |
| Global military (wartime scenario) | 3,000-10,000 tonnes/year |
Sensitivity analysis — what moves military Sb demand:
| Variable | Low Case | Base Case | High Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| US small-cal production (B rds/yr) | 1.2 | 1.6 | 2.5 |
| Sb per round (mg, weighted avg) | 40 | 70 | 100 |
| US military Sb (tonnes/yr) | 48 | 112 | 250 |
| Global military Sb (tonnes/yr) | 500 | 1,500 | 5,000 |
| Share of global Sb supply | 0.5% | 1.5% | 5.0% |
Military demand is small in peacetime (~1-2% of total) but has massive optionality in conflict scenarios — and unlike flame retardants or batteries, there is essentially zero substitution flexibility on short timescales. The US consumes ammunition constantly in training, and the Ukraine proxy war has demonstrated that modern conflict burns through munitions at rates that exceed peacetime production capacity.
Defense spending to antimony demand chain:
Defense Budget (~$850B) -> Ammunition Procurement (~$5-8B/yr)
-> Small-Caliber Ammo (~$1.5-2.5B/yr) -> Lake City (1.6B rounds/yr)
-> Sb Consumption: 80-250 tonnes/yr (peacetime)
-> Wartime surge: 500-1,000+ tonnes/yr (3-5x multiplier)
Historical wartime consumption runs 3-5x peacetime rates. Ukraine proxy: US has supplied 2M+ artillery rounds, billions of small-arms rounds since 2022.
4. Solar Glass (~4,000-5,000 tonnes/year, fastest growing)
Sodium antimonate (NaSbO3) or antimony trioxide used as a fining agent in low-iron solar glass. It removes gas bubbles from molten glass melt and converts Fe2+ (which absorbs solar spectrum) to Fe3+ (more transparent). Critical for high-transmission glass achieving >91% light transmittance.
Antimony intensity in solar:
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Sb content in solar glass | 0.2-0.3% by weight |
| Front glass weight per module | ~16 kg (standard 60/72-cell panel) |
| Antimony per module | ~32-48 g (~40 g typical) |
| Modules per GW (est.) | ~2 million (at 500W/module) |
| Antimony per GW of solar | ~80 tonnes |
| Global solar installations (2024) | ~450-500 GW |
| Total solar Sb demand (2024 est.) | ~4,000-5,000 tonnes/year |
At 500+ GW annual installations projected through 2030, solar glass could consume 5,000-8,000 tonnes of antimony annually — roughly 3-5% of total supply. Some producers are developing antimony-free alternatives (cerium-based fining agents), but adoption remains limited.
5. PET Catalysts (6% of demand)
Antimony trioxide as a polycondensation catalyst — 200-300 ppm Sb in finished PET resin. Global PET production is ~80+ million tonnes/year, implying ~10,000-15,000 tonnes Sb metal equivalent consumed annually.
6. Semiconductors & IR Optics (<1% of demand)
Indium antimonide (InSb) for mid-wave IR detectors used in FLIR systems, thermal cameras, missile seekers. Gallium antimonide (GaSb) for mid-IR lasers and thermophotovoltaic cells. Measured in grams per wafer, not tonnes — a 3-inch InSb wafer contains ~15-25 g Sb. Small in absolute tonnage but high-value ($500-2,000/kg for semiconductor-grade) and defense-critical. InSb focal plane arrays are the primary detector technology in US military FLIR, thermal weapon sights, and missile guidance.
Global Supply Picture
Global mine production: ~83,000-90,000 tonnes/year
| Source | 2023 (tonnes) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| China | 40,000 | Export controls since Aug 2024; ban on US exports Dec 2024 |
| Tajikistan | 21,000 | Expanding; Anzob mine |
| Russia | 4,300 | Sanctions complicate Western trade |
| Myanmar | ~4,000 | Artisanal, conflict-zone supply |
| Turkey | ~3,000 | Expanding |
| Bolivia | ~3,000 | |
| Others | ~8,000 | Australia, Mexico, Vietnam |
| Secondary (recycled) | ~15,000-20,000 | Mostly from Pb-acid battery recycling |
| Total supply | ~100,000-110,000 |
Key gap: Total supply of ~100-110kt vs. consumption of ~160kt implies significant processing of existing stockpiles, unreported production, or Chinese refinery output exceeding Chinese mine output (processing imported concentrates). China's role as both the largest miner and the dominant processor means the supply picture is more complex than mine production figures suggest.
7. US DoD Antimony Stockpile Status
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Current NDS inventory | ~1,100 tonnes |
| Target stockpile level | ~3,000 tonnes |
| Planned procurement (DLA) | $245M from UAMY |
| Domestic mine production (current) | Essentially zero before UAMY |
| Import reliance | 85% (54% from China directly or indirectly) |
Demand Forecasting Framework
Each end-use sector should be modeled independently:
Flame Retardants: Global plastics output (tonnes) x FR-treated share (%) x avg ATO loading (wt%) x Sb2O3-to-Sb conversion (83.5%). Drivers: plastics growth (~3-4% CAGR), building/fire codes (tightening globally), data center wire & cable. Risks: non-halogenated FR substitution, EU regulatory pressure.
Lead-Acid Batteries: Global Pb-acid battery shipments (GWh or units) x avg Sb content per unit — segmented by automotive vs. industrial. Drivers: vehicle fleet growth (developing world), industrial/telecom backup. Risks: lead-calcium grid shift, Li-ion substitution in forklifts.
Solar Glass: Solar GW installed x 2 million modules/GW x 0.040 kg Sb/module = GW x 80 tonnes Sb/GW. Drivers: annual installations (currently ~450-500 GW/yr). Risks: antimony-free alternatives (cerium-based), thinner glass designs.
Military: Defense budget allocation -> ammunition procurement volume -> antimony intensity conversion -> wartime multiplier. The most volatile segment but with zero substitution flexibility.
Input-Conversion-Output Model
INPUT LAYER CONVERSION LAYER OUTPUT LAYER
(Raw Antimony) (Intermediates) (End Products)
Mine production ---+
China: 40,000t | +-- ATO (Sb2O3) --------------- Flame retardants
Tajikistan:21kt | | (~43% of Sb) PET catalysts
Russia: 4,300t +---- +-- Antimony metal ------------- Lead-acid batteries
Myanmar: ~4,000 | | (~32% + 14% alloys) Ammunition
Turkey: ~3,000 | +-- Sodium antimonate ---------- Solar glass
Bolivia: ~3,000 | | (NaSbO3, ~4%) Specialty glass
Others: ~8,000 | +-- Antimony trisulfide -------- Primers, pyrotechnics
| | (Sb2S3, ~1%)
Recycled supply ---+ +-- III-V compounds ------------ IR detectors (InSb)
(~15-18% of US (InSb, GaSb, <1%) Military optics
consumption)
Stockpiles --------- Strategic reserve drawdown Surge capacity
NDS: 1,100t
Target: 3,000t
Demand Forecasting Takeaways
- Flame retardants dominate demand (~43-49%), driven by fire codes, plastics growth, and data centers. This is the tonnage story.
- Batteries are structurally declining in per-unit Sb intensity (shift to calcium grids), but installed base and industrial applications maintain volume.
- Solar glass is the fastest-growing end use — scaling with 500+ GW/year of solar deployment.
- Military is small but strategically critical — a conflict scenario could spike demand 3-5x with zero substitution flexibility.
- Supply is the binding constraint — China + Russia = ~90% of global supply from adversarial sources. Price has 4x'd in 18 months with fundamentals suggesting sustained tightness.
Fostung Tungsten Property — The Optionality Play
The Resource
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Location | ~70 km west of Sudbury, Ontario (near Espanola) |
| Classification | Inferred (lowest confidence under SK-1300) |
| Tonnage | 14.62 million metric tonnes |
| Grade | 0.17% WO3 |
| Contained metal | 53.595 million lbs WO3 |
| Gross in-situ value | ~$4.6 billion |
| Acquisition cost | $5M cash + 0.5% NSR |
| Consultant | SRK Consulting (Canada) Inc. |
| Mining method | Open pit initially, expanding to underground |
Why the $4.6B Number Is Misleading
The $4.6B is gross in-situ metal value — the theoretical value if you could magically teleport every atom of tungsten out at spot prices with zero cost. No serious mining analyst uses this for valuation.
The discount waterfall from GIMV to equity value:
| Factor | Typical Discount |
|---|---|
| Mining recovery | 85-95% |
| Processing recovery | 65-75% for tungsten |
| Mining + processing cost | $15-50/t ore |
| G&A, royalties, taxes | 15-25% of revenue |
| Capital expenditure | $200M-$500M+ |
| Time value of money | 8-12% discount rate |
| Inferred resource penalty | Up to 50% further discount |
| Permitting & development risk | 3-7 years to production |
Simplified math:
- Gross in-situ value: $4.6B
- After recoveries, costs, taxes, discounting: $500M-$700M NPV (optimistic, pre-risk)
- Inferred resource confidence discount (50%): $250M-$350M
- Market cap is already ~$1.34B, so Fostung adds ~19-26% of current cap
In-Situ Value Benchmarks
| Scenario | % of GIMV | Implied Value | Per Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear case (pure inferred, no study) | 1% | $46M | $0.31 |
| Base case (inferred + DPA pathway) | 3% | $138M | $0.92 |
| Bull case (strategic premium, resource grows) | 5% | $230M | $1.53 |
Best Comparable: Mt Mulgine (Tungsten Mining NL)
| Metric | Mt Mulgine | Fostung |
|---|---|---|
| Resource | 89 Mt @ 0.11% WO3 | 14.62 Mt @ 0.17% WO3 |
| Contained WO3 | ~214M lbs | 53.6M lbs |
| Study stage | Scoping study (2025) | Initial resource (2026) |
| NPV (pre-tax) | A$1.0-1.4B (~US$650-900M) | Not yet calculated |
| Capex | A$358-495M (~US$230-320M) | Unknown |
| IRR | 30-45% | Unknown |
| Byproducts | Mo, Cu, Au, Ag | None reported |
| Market cap | ~A$350M | N/A (part of UAMY) |
Mt Mulgine has ~4x the contained metal, multi-commodity credits, and a completed scoping study showing strong economics — yet trades at a market cap representing ~40% of its pre-tax NPV. Fostung is far earlier stage, single-commodity, and smaller. The comp suggests Fostung's standalone value is well below $200M until a PEA demonstrates economics.
Resource Change vs. Prior Estimate
The new SK-1300 resource is larger but lower-grade — tonnage increased 18% (12.4 -> 14.62 Mt) but grade dropped from 0.213% to 0.17% WO3. This suggests SRK used a lower cut-off (0.08% vs. prior 0.125%) to capture more marginal material. At 0.17% WO3, Fostung is a low-grade tungsten deposit by global standards.
SK-1300 Technical Report Context
SK-1300 is the SEC's mining disclosure framework (effective 2021), replacing the old Industry Guide 7. It allows disclosure of inferred resources (Guide 7 did not), requires a qualified person to sign off, and mandates disclosure of key assumptions. The report should contain geological model, cut-off grade analysis, processing considerations, and preliminary mining method assessment. It probably won't contain full economic analysis (NPV, IRR, capex) — that comes with the PEA.
What Makes Fostung Strategically Interesting
- Acquisition was brilliant — $5M for a strategic tungsten deposit in a supply-constrained market is exceptional capital allocation
- DPA Title III funding pathway — if awarded for tungsten too, this de-risks capex substantially
- First Western tungsten mine in a decade — narrative value in a market obsessed with critical mineral supply chain security
- Near Sudbury — world-class mining jurisdiction with infrastructure and skilled labor
- Synergy with antimony business — tungsten and antimony share defense/strategic end markets and government customer relationships
- Tungsten tailwind is real — APT prices surged ~218% in 2025, China cut mining quotas 6.5%, CICC forecasts structural global deficit of 20,000 MTU by 2028
Bottom Line on Fostung
Don't buy UAMY for Fostung alone. At current market cap, the stock prices in the antimony franchise plus some optionality. Fostung is a bonus, not the thesis. Wait for the PEA — until there's a preliminary economic assessment with actual capex/opex numbers, any valuation is guesswork. Position sizing implication: Fostung doesn't change the verdict. It's a free call option embedded in the antimony thesis.
What to Watch
| Catalyst | Timeline |
|---|---|
| SK-1300 report filed on EDGAR | Weeks (March-April 2026) |
| DPA Title III application for tungsten | H1 2026 |
| PEA / scoping study | 6-12 months (game-changer) |
| Infill drilling campaign | TBD |
| Environmental assessment filing | 12-18 months |
Competitive Landscape
| Company | Ticker | Status | Mkt Cap | Antimony Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UAMY | UAMY | Producing | $1.28B | Only Western Hemisphere smelter; expanding to 400-500 t/mo |
| Perpetua Resources | PPTA | Development | $3.90B | Stibnite Gold Project (ID); 3-5 yrs from production |
| Mandalay Resources | MND.TO | Producing | ~$500M | Gold/antimony from Costerfield (AU); small Sb output |
| Larvotto Resources | LRV.AX | Development | ~$50M | Hillgrove antimony-gold project (AU) |
| Military Metals | MILI.V | Exploration | ~$30M | Slovakian antimony projects |
| Hunan Gold | 002155.SZ | Producing | — | Chinese; operates Xikuangshan, world's largest Sb mine |
UAMY's moat: Only significant non-Chinese smelter in the Americas. Perpetua is the nearest competitor but won't produce until ~2028-2029 and has ~$1.3B CapEx ahead of it. UAMY is the only game in town RIGHT NOW.
Porter's Five Forces:
- Supplier power: Moderate — UAMY sources ore globally from 7+ countries
- Buyer power: Low — DLA and defense contractors have no alternative domestic supplier
- New entrants: Very low threat — smelter takes years of permitting and capital
- Substitutes: Very low for defense (no substitute for Sb2S3 in primers); moderate for flame retardants (aluminum hydroxide exists but inferior)
- Rivalry: Minimal — UAMY has no Western Hemisphere competitor of scale
Industry structure: Extremely consolidated at the processing layer. China dominates ~80% of smelting/refining. UAMY is a de facto monopoly in the Western Hemisphere. Barriers to entry are very high — environmental permitting for a smelter takes years, capital requirements are significant, and qualification with DoD buyers takes time. No new Western smelters are under construction or even proposed besides UAMY's expansion.
Cyclical vs. secular: Both. Antimony pricing is cyclical (tied to Chinese production decisions and global demand), but the current supply disruption is secular — China's export controls are part of a strategic critical minerals policy. The defense demand driver is also secular. We're in the early stages of a structural supply deficit. Prices have pulled back from the July 2025 peak of $59,750/t to ~$37,000/t but remain 5-7x above the historical average.
Global Market Size
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024 market size | ~$1.0-1.1B |
| Projected 2032 | ~$1.78B (6.5% CAGR) |
| Global production | ~160,000 tonnes/year |
| US annual consumption | ~25,000 tonnes (50M+ lbs) |
| US domestic production pre-UAMY restart | Effectively zero |
| Import dependence | ~100% |
| National stockpile | 1,100 tonnes (18 days of supply) |
Emerging Threats & Disruptors
- Perpetua Resources (PPTA) — most credible future competitor, but 3-5 years away and likely a UAMY customer (toll processing) rather than competitor
- Larvotto Resources (LRV.AX) and Military Metals (MILI.V) — early-stage, years from production
- Recycling: Some Sb recovered from lead-acid battery recycling, but volumes are small
- Substitution: For flame retardants, alternatives exist but are inferior. For defense (primers), there is no substitute
- China policy reversal: The biggest "disruptor" — if China lifts export controls, the entire Western antimony thesis collapses
Management
Leadership
| Name | Title | Background |
|---|---|---|
| Gary C. Evans | Chairman & CEO (since Dec 2024) | Serial entrepreneur, 3 companies public, raised $7B+ on Wall Street, age 68 |
| Rick Isaak | SVP & CFO (since Jul 2023) | CPA; 12 yrs Ernst & Young; CFO at Panera Bread, Heritage Home Group |
| Lloyd Bardswich, P.Eng. | EVP & Chief Mining Engineer; Director | Mining engineer, QP under SEC S-K 1300, former co-CEO |
| John Gustavsen | President, Antimony Division | BS Chemistry, Rutgers; 50+ yrs antimony chemistry; joined 2011 |
| Melissa Pagen | President & COO, Bear River Zeolite | 20+ years business development/IR |
Gary C. Evans — The Full Picture
Evans joined UAMY's board in November 2022, became Chairman in July 2023, Co-CEO in March 2024, sole CEO in December 2024. Classic boardroom takeover — he got on the board, grabbed the chair, installed himself as CEO within two years.
Prior companies:
| Company | Role | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Magnum Hunter 1.0 (1985-2005) | Chairman/CEO | Sold to Cimarex Energy for $2.2B. His one genuine success. |
| GreenHunter Energy (2006-2016) | Founder/CEO | Oilfield water management. Went bankrupt. Sold to PE. |
| Magnum Hunter 2.0 (2009-2015) | Chairman/CEO | Aggressive shale drilling. Revenue $6M to $100M+. Chapter 11 bankruptcy Dec 2015 with ~$1B debt. Equity wiped out. Evans forced out by creditors. |
| Energy Hunter Resources (2016) | Founder | Started immediately after bankruptcy. Drew a scathing Seeking Alpha warning. Went nowhere. |
| Evergreen Sustainable (EGSE) | Chairman/CEO/largest shareholder | Hemp company pivoted to "bitcoin mining using hemp biomass as biofuel." OTCQB. Evans still controls this — live conflict of interest. |
| Novavax (NVAX) | Director 1998-2022 (~24 yrs) | Strongest governance credential. NVAX hit $20B+ during COVID. |
SEC Enforcement History:
- March 2015: Evans personally received a Wells Notice from the SEC related to Magnum Hunter Resources. Alleged violations of Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) and Exchange Act Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B) — faulty internal controls and financial reporting failures.
- SEC settled with the company ($250K fine) and CFO ($25K). Evans was not individually sanctioned in the final order — but the personal Wells Notice and CEO role during the period of deficient controls are material facts his current bio omits entirely.
Pattern: Evans is a capital-markets operator, not a mining guy. Skilled at taking companies public, doing offerings, and talking on TV. His operational track record: one good exit (2005), one bankruptcy (2015), and a string of entities with "Hunter" in the name.
Board of Directors
| Name | Independent? | Background |
|---|---|---|
| Gary C. Evans | No (CEO/Chair) | Serial entrepreneur, see above |
| Lloyd Bardswich | No (officer) | Mining engineer, former co-CEO |
| Joseph Carrabba | Yes | Retired Chairman/CEO of Cleveland-Cliffs (2007-2013). Strongest board member. |
| Michael McManus Jr. | Yes | Aggressive insider buyer at lows. 24+ year Evans associate via Novavax board. |
| Blaise Aguirre, MD | Yes | Harvard Med School psychiatrist (McLean Hospital). Has Series 7/63. A psychiatrist on a mining company board. |
| Jon Marinelli | Yes | 1042 Capital Partners founder, ex-BMO/Deutsche Bank. Involved in "$5B of prior financings with Evans." Long-standing Evans associate. |
| Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.) | Yes | Retired 4-star Army General, former Vice Chief of Staff. DoD credibility. |
Evans remade the board entirely in ~2.3 years. McManus-Evans Novavax connection undermines independence claims. Three independent directors serve on ALL three key committees — no specialization.
ISS Governance QualityScore: 10/10 (worst possible). Pillar scores: Audit 10, Board 10, Shareholder Rights 5, Compensation 8.
Insider Ownership & Skin in the Game
| Name | Role | Shares | % | Est. Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kenneth M. Reed | 10% owner | ~38.14M | ~27% | ~$348M |
| Gary C. Evans | Chairman/CEO | ~2.38M | ~1.7% | ~$22M |
| Michael McManus Jr. | Director | ~539K | ~0.4% | ~$4.9M |
| Rick Isaak | CFO | ~252K | ~0.2% | ~$2.3M |
| Lloyd Bardswich | EVP/CME | 594 | <0.01% | ~$6.5K |
Kenneth Reed at 27% is the elephant in the room — public information on who he is and his relationship to management is extremely limited.
The CEO owns only 1.7% despite controlling the company. However, Evans bought meaningfully on the open market — $900K+ between late 2024 and Sep 2025 ($1.45 and $6.13). Real money going in.
Bardswich sold down to 594 shares — essentially his entire position. That's a meaningful red flag from the person running mining operations.
Recent insider selling (Sep-Oct 2025): McManus, Isaak, Fink, and Bardswich sold a combined $1.16M after the stock ran from ~$1 to $7-8. Multiple insiders selling in a tight window while the CEO was buying is notable divergence.
Management Credibility
| Period | What They Said | What Happened |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 (initial) | Revenue $40-50M | Narrowed to $40-43M; likely low end |
| Q3 2025 | $12.8M consensus | $8.7M actual — 32% miss |
| Q3 2025 EPS | $0.03 consensus | -$0.04 actual — 233% miss |
| Oct 2025 | Raised 2026 guidance to $125M | Same month as about-to-be-reported Q3 miss |
Raising forward guidance while simultaneously missing current-period numbers is classic promotional behavior. It tells the market to look ahead to the shiny future while the present is disappointing.
Follow-through rate: ~50%. Guidance tendency: Aggressive.
Compensation & Alignment
| Component (FY2024) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $0 |
| Board Fees | $167,084 |
| Cash Bonus | $200,000 |
| Stock Awards (RSUs) | $165,000 |
| Option Awards | $120,000 |
| Total (SCT) | $658,740 |
| Comp Actually Paid | $2,498,740 (equity appreciation) |
The $0 base salary is a positive signal — Evans gets paid through equity appreciation. But the company remained unprofitable in all three reported years, so compensation is tied purely to stock price, not profitability.
Key concerns:
- Time-based vesting only — no performance hurdles (revenue, EBITDA, TSR targets)
- Single-trigger change-in-control: 100% immediate vesting on acquisition
- SBC exploded from $454K to $4.69M in 9 months (10x)
- No anti-hedging policy disclosed
- Evans outstanding awards: 750K options at $0.22 strike (~$6.6M intrinsic value) + 500K unvested RSUs
Shell & Cross-Holdings
Evans simultaneously serves as Chairman/CEO of UAMY and Chairman/CEO of Generation Hemp (GENH) and Chairman/CEO of Evergreen Sustainable. This triple-CEO role creates obvious time allocation conflicts. The UAMY proxy mentions no explicit policy addressing how Evans splits his time. For a company with a $245M DLA contract to execute, Alaska and Montana mining operations to ramp, and a smelter expansion underway — this is not a part-time job.
No direct related-party transactions between UAMY and Evans' other entities were identified in available filings. The headquarters relocation to Dallas (where Evans is based and where Generation Hemp is also headquartered) is worth monitoring.
Management DD Verdict
| Dimension | Rating | Key Finding |
|---|---|---|
| Skin in the Game | Yellow | Evans bought $900K+ on open market. But owns only 1.7%, Bardswich sold to 594 shares. |
| Holdings Concentration | Red | CEO simultaneously runs EGSE. Split attention and fiduciary duties. |
| Shell / Cross-Holdings | Red | EGSE is a live conflict. B2i Digital consulting is related-party-adjacent. |
| Capital Allocation | Red | Shares doubled since 2015. $400M ATM on $1.3B cap. Zero buybacks. SBC up 10x. |
| Compensation Alignment | Yellow | Low base salary but single-trigger CIC, no ownership guidelines, SBC explosion. |
| Governance Quality | Red | ISS 10/10 worst. Board remade in 2 years. Psychiatrist on mining board. |
| Credibility | Red | Q3 miss of 32% while raising 2026 guidance. 50% follow-through rate. |
| Litigation / Enforcement | Red | SEC Wells Notice (2015). $1B bankruptcy. Evans forced out by creditors. |
| Overall | Red | The asset is excellent. The operator has a troubling track record and governance is objectively poor. |
Green flags: Evans' open-market purchases, $0 base salary, CFO Isaak's Big 4 background, DLA/Title III are real government commitments, corporate structure is clean.
Bottom line: Gary Evans is a skilled promoter and capital raiser sitting in a genuinely favorable market position. The question is not whether the opportunity exists — it does — but whether Evans is the right steward of shareholder capital through execution. His track record says "maybe not." If you own UAMY, you're betting this time is different.
Financials
Key Metrics
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Market cap | ~$1.28B |
| Enterprise value | ~$1.26B |
| Revenue (TTM) | ~$33M |
| Revenue growth (9M YoY) | +182% |
| Gross margin | 25.8% (TTM), 28% (9M 2025) |
| Operating margin | -17.5% (TTM) |
| Net income (TTM) | -$4.94M |
| EPS (TTM) | -$0.04 to -$0.05 |
| Free cash flow (TTM) | -$21.32M |
| Cash position | ~$38.5M (Q3 2025); ~$64M post-Oct offering |
| Net debt | Net cash of $19.3M |
| Long-term debt | $0.27M (essentially zero) |
| Forward P/E (FY26E) | 54x |
| EV/Sales (TTM) | ~38x |
| EV/Revenue (FY26E) | ~10x |
| Price/Book | 17.4x |
| 52-week range | $1.26 - $19.71 |
| Beta (5Y) | 0.05 |
| Current ratio | 5.1x |
| Short interest | 27.7M shares (~22.8% of float) |
Income Statement
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | LTM | FY2026E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.0M | $8.7M | $14.9M | $33.1M | $125.6M |
| Revenue growth | +42.6% | -21.3% | +71.8% | +202% | +218% |
| Gross profit | $2.0M | -$3.3M | $3.5M | $8.5M | — |
| Gross margin | 18.1% | -38.5% | 23.2% | 25.8% | — |
| Net income | $0.38M | -$6.4M | -$1.7M | -$4.9M | — |
| EPS | $0.00 | -$0.06 | -$0.02 | -$0.05 | $0.20 |
FY2022 was the only profitable year in recent history. FY2023 was a disaster with negative gross margins (inventory write-downs, depressed Sb prices). FY2024 saw the inflection — revenue +72% driven by antimony revenue +88% (volume +34%, pricing +40%), zeolite +19%. The company was briefly GAAP profitable in H1 2025 ($728K net income, +707% YoY) before Q3's SBC explosion and expansion costs dragged it back to losses.
FY2024 Annual Results Detail:
- Revenue: $14.94M (+72% YoY)
- Gross profit: $3.5M (+204% YoY); cost of sales decreased 5%
- Net loss: -$1.74M (improved 73% from -$6.36M in FY2023)
- Cash: $18.17M; total assets $34.64M; total liabilities $6.04M
- Long-term debt: $0.20M (minimal)
9M 2025 Results:
- Revenue: $26.23M (+182% YoY); Q3 standalone $8.7M (missed $12.8M consensus by 32%)
- Gross profit: $7.22M (+219% YoY); gross margin 28% (up from 24%)
- Net loss: -$4.1M (includes $5.2M non-cash expenses + $4.69M SBC)
- Cash: $38.5M; post-Oct offering ~$64M
- Total assets: $79.88M (nearly tripled from FY24)
Cash Flow & Balance Sheet
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | LTM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | -$0.25M | -$4.75M | $2.22M | -$5.04M |
| Capex | -$1.73M | -$1.53M | -$0.43M | -$16.28M |
| Free cash flow | -$1.98M | -$6.28M | $1.79M | -$21.32M |
| Net debt (cash) | -$19.0M | -$11.9M | -$17.1M | -$19.3M |
| SBC | — | — | $0.57M | $4.80M |
| Stock issuance | — | — | $4.24M | $47.14M |
Balance sheet is clean — essentially zero debt ($0.27M), $38-64M cash depending on measurement date, total assets nearly tripled from $34.6M to $79.9M reflecting smelter expansion and inventory build. Current ratio 5.1x. No financial distress risk whatsoever.
This is a company that funds itself entirely through equity issuance, not cash generation. TTM capex of $16.3M = Thompson Falls expansion. TTM stock issuance of $47.1M = serial equity raises. FY2024 was the only year of positive FCF in recent history ($1.79M).
Incremental Margin Analysis
| Quarter | Revenue | Gross Margin | EBIT Margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 2023 | $1.67M | -122% | -223% |
| Q1 2024 | $3.07M | 19.2% | -15.3% |
| Q2 2024 | $3.66M | 34.2% | 1.6% |
| Q3 2024 | $2.57M | 16.3% | -34.6% |
| Q4 2024 | $6.87M | 19.1% | -18.3% |
| Q1 2025 | $7.00M | 33.9% | 5.1% |
| Q2 2025 | $10.53M | 27.0% | 0.2% |
| Q3 2025 | $8.70M | 23.1% | -56.5% |
YoY incremental gross margins run 23-45% — new revenue is reasonably high quality at the gross profit level. But incremental EBIT is terrible because SBC and expansion costs wipe out operating leverage. Stripping out SBC, the operating business was roughly breakeven in Q3 2025.
The bet: If SBC normalizes and expansion capex rolls off, 20-30% incremental EBIT margins are plausible at $100M+ revenue.
Dilution History
| Year | Shares Outstanding | YoY Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 66.2M | — |
| 2020 | 73.2M | +5.8% |
| 2021 | 106.2M | +44.9% |
| 2024 | 108.4M | +0.7% |
| 2025 | 123.4M | +13.8% |
| Current | ~140M | +13.4% |
From 2015 to today, shares outstanding have more than doubled (66M -> ~140M). 2025 equity raises: $69.25M across three registered direct offerings at $4.50, $7.50, and $10.52/share. Plus a $400M ATM shelf through A.G.P. and B. Riley — on a ~$1.3B cap, that's potential dilution of 28-40%. Massive overhang.
Zero buybacks. Not even discussed. Capital allocation grade: D.
Valuation
| Scenario | Revenue | EBITDA Margin | EBITDA | EV/EBITDA | Implied EV | Per Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear: Delays, Sb at $20K | $60M | 15% | $9M | 15x | $135M | ~$1.00 |
| Base: Hit 400 t/mo, Sb at $25K | $125M | 25% | $31M | 20x | $625M | ~$4.50 |
| Bull: Full capacity, Sb at $35K | $175M | 30% | $53M | 25x | $1,313M | ~$9.40 |
Current EV of ~$1.26B prices in the bull case. You're paying full freight for everything going right.
At $9.13/share, the market prices in:
- Thompson Falls expansion on time (April 2026)
- Antimony prices staying at $30,000+/tonne
- DLA and commercial contracts converting to revenue on schedule
- No further meaningful dilution
- 25-30% EBITDA margins at scale
That's a lot of things that all need to go right.
Simple DCF Framework
- Revenue: $125M (2026) -> $150M (2027) -> $175M (2028) — assumes continued growth from capacity + new contracts
- EBITDA margin: 30% steady state -> $37.5M (2026), $45M (2027), $52.5M (2028)
- Terminal multiple: 8x EBITDA (commodity producer)
- Discount rate: 15% (high risk)
- Implied fair value: ~$800M-$1.2B -> current price is at the top of the fair value range
- Bear case (Sb normalizes to $25K/t, revenue $60M): Fair value ~$300-400M -> 60-70% downside
Would You Buy at 10-15% Higher?
No. At $10-$10.50, the stock would be pricing in perfection with zero margin of safety. The risk/reward deteriorates rapidly above $9.
Analyst Sentiment
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | Price Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nick Giles | B. Riley Securities | Strong Buy | $11.00 |
| — | HC Wainwright | Buy | $10.25 |
Critical conflict: A.G.P./Alliance Global Partners and B. Riley are UAMY's placement agents for equity offerings and the $400M ATM. Having your investment bankers also publish "buy" ratings is a textbook conflict.
Coverage is thin (2-5 analysts). Consensus FY2026E: Revenue $125.58M, EPS $0.20.
Ownership
| Category | % |
|---|---|
| Institutional ownership | 43.4% |
| Insider ownership | ~64% (dominated by Reed's 27%) |
Top institutional holders: State Street (5.5%), BlackRock, Vanguard, Hood River Capital, Geode Capital.
Short interest: 27.7M shares, 22.8% of float. Elevated — significant bearish positioning.
Catalysts & Risks
Secular Tailwinds
- China export ban — structural, driven by geopolitical strategy. Durability: 5-10yr+
- Defense restocking — bipartisan, driven by genuine strategic vulnerability. Durability: 3-5yr+
- Critical minerals policy — DPA Title III, executive orders, rare bipartisan alignment. Durability: 3-5yr
- Solar/renewable energy — antimony in solar glass manufacturing. Growing 3-5% CAGR
- Data center build-out — wire & cable demand driving ATO consumption
Secular Headwinds
- Recycling improvements could increase secondary supply over 5-10 years
- Substitution R&D on flame retardant alternatives — low impact over 3-5 years
- Modern automotive batteries shifting to lead-calcium (zero Sb)
Near-Term Catalysts (0-12 months)
| Catalyst | Timeline | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Thompson Falls expansion completion | April 2026 | THE catalyst. If 400+ t/mo capacity hits, revenue trajectory is validated |
| FY2025 annual results | April 1, 2026 | Update on expansion progress and 2026 outlook |
| First full quarter at expanded capacity | Q2 2026 | Will show if the ramp is real |
| Additional DLA delivery orders | Ongoing | Revenue flow against $245M IDIQ |
| Alaska exploration results | Summer 2026 | Own-source ore = higher margins |
| SK-1300 tungsten report on EDGAR | March-April 2026 | Full Fostung technical details |
Medium-Term Catalysts (1-3 years)
- Perpetua Resources Stibnite Gold Project progress — validates UAMY as toll processor
- Alaska mine development — own-source ore reducing input costs
- Additional DoD contracts beyond current $245M
- NYSE inclusion in small-cap indices -> passive flow
- DPA Title III application for tungsten (Fostung)
- PEA / scoping study on Fostung (game-changer for tungsten optionality)
Key Binary Event
China export control decision (November 2026) — the single biggest risk. If China lifts controls, antimony prices crash and the entire Western thesis collapses.
Antimony Price Trajectory
| Period | Price ($/tonne) | Driver |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 avg | ~$12,000 | Stable |
| May 2024 | $17,588 | Supply tightening |
| June 2024 | $22,700 | China export license requirement |
| Dec 2024 | $30,000+ | China bans Sb exports to US |
| 2025 peak | $59,750 | Supply deficit, strategic stockpiling |
| Feb 2026 | ~$37,000 (EU), ~$26,000 (NE Asia) | Partial correction |
Top Risks
| Risk | Probability | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thompson Falls expansion delayed | 30-40% | Very High — $125M guidance impossible without it | Monitor monthly; DPA funding secured |
| China lifts antimony export controls | 25-35% | Very High — Sb price crash to $15-20K/t | Time-bounded trade; trailing stop |
| CEO Evans value destruction | 20-30% | Medium-High — death by 1,000 cuts on dilution | Monitor SBC, insider transactions, offerings |
| Dilution | High | Medium — $400M ATM active, company has history of serial issuance | Structural feature; cannot be eliminated |
| Customer concentration (DLA) | Medium | High — government is dominant customer | $106.7M commercial contract diversifies somewhat |
| Commodity price volatility | Medium | Medium — margin compression if Sb pulls back | Long-term contracts reduce but don't eliminate |
| Single-smelter concentration | Medium | High — Thompson Falls is single point of failure | Madero provides partial redundancy |
Key-Person Risk
Evans has no employment contract, no non-compete, no formal time commitment. He's simultaneously CEO of EGSE. If Evans leaves or becomes incapacitated, there is no obvious successor with his capital-markets skillset. Bardswich handles mining operations; Pagen handles zeolite/IR. Neither is a CEO candidate. The DLA contract and government relationships are partly based on Evans' personal network and Gen. Keane's credibility — these could be disrupted by a leadership change.
Technology & Development Roadmap
- Flotation facility: Acquired critical minerals flotation facility for $4.75M (Jan 2026) — enables processing of finer-grained ores from Montana and Alaska
- "Project Vault": Announced Feb 2026 (details limited — appears to be a strategic initiative)
- Hydromet processing: JV with Americas Gold & Silver for Bolivia hydromet (Feb 2026) — alkaline leach approach works with complex/mixed ores, lower emissions than pyrometallurgy
- Tungsten: Fostung property — early-stage R&D on second critical mineral
Bear Case Scenario
- Thompson Falls delayed to late 2026 + antimony prices drop to $20K/t + Evans uses $400M ATM aggressively
- UAMY does $50-60M revenue at 15-20% margins, shares diluted to 200M+
- Downside target: $1.00-$2.50 (implied $350-560M market cap)
- Max loss from current: 55-70%
What Would Invalidate the Thesis
- China permanently lifting antimony export controls
- A second Western smelter reaching commercial production (unlikely within 3 years)
- Evans engineering a related-party transaction between UAMY and his other entities
- Thompson Falls expansion failing technically
Decision Log
Pre-Buy Checklist Score: 4.5 / 8 — Mixed but Actionable with Discipline
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Can I state the thesis clearly? | Yes — sole Western smelter + contracted revenue + geopolitical tailwind |
| Do I understand the business? | Yes — antimony smelting/refining, ATO production |
| Are the financials healthy? | No — still net-loss, negative FCF, heavy SBC. Cash adequate but funded by dilution |
| Is the valuation reasonable? | No — priced for perfect execution at 10x forward revenue and 25-35x forward EBITDA |
| Am I falling into a behavioral trap? | Partially — narrative seduction present. Antimony/China/defense story is extremely compelling but valuation prices it in |
| Do the technicals support buying now? | Partially — uptrend intact but stock is extended short-term |
| Have I sized the position appropriately? | Yes — 2-3% max with scale-in plan |
| Do I have a clear exit plan? | Yes — sell triggers defined |
Recommendation: WATCH -> SMALL BUY (with strict conditions)
The antimony thesis is real and UAMY is the best vehicle to play it. But at $1.29B market cap on $40M trailing revenue with a CEO who has two bankruptcies in his past, this is not a high-conviction buy at current prices.
Action plan:
- Start with a 1% position as toehold before NYSE uplisting
- Add on weakness — target $7.50-8.00 for second tranche
- Add on confirmation — Thompson Falls completion + revenue ramp evidence for third tranche
- Never exceed 3% unless both execution and China policy risks resolve favorably
- Hard stop at $5.00
The key date is April 2026 (Thompson Falls completion). If expansion is confirmed on-time and on-budget, the thesis strengthens considerably. If delayed, trim or exit.
Entry & Exit Criteria
Buy triggers:
- Scale in: 1/3 now, 1/3 on pullback to $7.50-8.00 (50-day MA), 1/3 on breakout above $9.54 on volume or positive Thompson Falls update
Sell triggers:
- Thompson Falls expansion delayed beyond Q3 2026
- China permanently lifts antimony export controls
- Antimony price drops below $25,000/t sustained
- Stock reaches $15-18 (implied $2.1-2.5B cap) representing ~1.5-2x forward EV/Revenue on $125M
- Evans announces a large secondary at a discount
- Any related-party transaction between UAMY and Evans' other entities
Stop loss: $5.00 (below 200-day MA + significant support)
Key Questions Still Open
- Who is Kenneth Reed (27% holder) and what is his relationship to management?
- Will Thompson Falls expansion hit 400-500 t/mo nameplate by April 2026?
- What is the actual pricing mechanism in the DLA contract — fixed or market-linked?
- Will Evans use the $400M ATM aggressively, and at what dilution pace?
- When will the SK-1300 Fostung technical report be filed on EDGAR?
- What happens at the November 2026 China export control review?
SEC Filing Observations
- No restatements or material weaknesses identified
- No auditor changes flagged
- No going concern language (company has $38.5M+ cash)
- Insider buying pattern: Evans — 10 buys, 0 sells. Positive.
- Key recent 8-Ks: NYSE uplisting; $106.7M ATO supply contract; $27M DPA award; tungsten resource; $245M DLA contract
- Key risk from filings: 40% share dilution in 2 years; SBC explosion to $4.69M (18% of revenue)
Topics
- critical-minerals
- supply-chain-security
- antimony
- defense-minerals
- tungsten
- china-export-controls