3026 — Holy Stone Enterprise Co., Ltd.

Thesis

Stance: AVOID / PASS at current price — wait for a 30%+ pullback or a thesis change. Holy Stone is a real beneficiary of the AI-server MLCC up-cycle, but the stock has done what cyclical MLCC stocks always do: front-run the cycle, then some. It rallied from TWD 313 (May 8 2026) to TWD 428–433.5 (May 21) — roughly +37–38% in two weeks — on essentially one earnings print and a guidance update, then hit a +10% limit-up at TWD 476.5 on May 23. Trailing P/E is now ~66x; the deep-dive and checklist both land at AVOID/PASS.

What has to be true to own it here: earnings must roughly double-to-triple from the LTM EPS of ~TWD 6.51 within FY2026, and Q1 2026's extreme ~90% incremental gross margin must be a structural mix shift rather than a one-quarter benefit. Neither is established. Holy Stone is a Tier-2/3 MLCC maker that has never traded above ~25x trailing P/E in the last decade except at the prior cycle peak (FY2022, high-20s); the current ~66x is roughly 2.5x that prior-peak multiple.

The single most important pivot: Q2 2026 incremental margin (early August print). If incrementals sustain even at 50%, FY2026 EPS prints north of TWD 12 comfortably; if they revert toward the ~30% historical mid-spec norm, FY2026 EPS lands closer to TWD 9–10 and the valuation case collapses. The 12-month target is TWD 280–320 (22–25x forward on FY2026E EPS ~TWD 12–13), implying −26% to −35% downside.

Conviction: Medium-High on direction (don't buy here), Low on timing — the stock could melt up another 20% on momentum before reverting. This is a wait-and-watch, not a short. The checklist scored it 4 Yes / 4 No / 1 Partial / 1 Zero-sized and a failing FundamentEdge scorecard (1 of 5 PASS). The 2026-05-23 MLCC sector handoff scored the basket Hard Pass 12/30. Three structural overhangs compound the price problem: opaque manufacture-vs-distribution disclosure, a 32-year founder Chair+President with no public successor, and single-analyst sell-side coverage with a stale TWD 160 PT.

Snapshot

Holy Stone Enterprise (3026.TW) is a Taiwan mid-cap MLCC hybrid — in-house manufacturer (IHHEC brand from Longtan + Yilan plants) plus authorised distributor for active and passive components across Asia.

• Ticker / exchange: 3026.TW · TWSE · Currency: TWD · FY end December
• Price: TWD 428.0 (profile, 2026-05-21) — other fragments use TWD 433.5 (mgmt-dd / checklist / deep-dive, 2026-05-21); +10% limit-up to TWD 476.5 on 2026-05-23 (price discrepancy across same-day snapshots — kept both)
• Market cap: TWD 71.0B (~US$2.2B) per profile; TWD 71.9B per deep-dive (minor discrepancy)
• Enterprise value: TWD 91.3B
• P/E (TTM): 65.7x (profile) / 66.6x (deep-dive) (discrepancy) · Forward P/E: 33.2x (profile) / 33.7x (deep-dive), single-analyst-derived
• EV/EBITDA: 46.5x · EV/Revenue: 6.7x · P/B: 10.6x (profile says 10.5x) · Beta: 0.68
• Dividend yield: 1.39% · Payout ratio: 84.5% · FCF yield: ~1.1–1.4%
• 52-week range: TWD 75.0 – 433.5
• FY2025 revenue: NT$13.43B (+5.0% YoY) · FY2025 net income: NT$1.09B (8.1% net margin)
• Insider ownership: 22.2% (Tang family + investment vehicles) · Institutional: 7.4%
• Sell-side coverage: 1 analyst (1 strong buy, mean PT TWD 160 — stale, predates the rally)
• SA mirror coverage: none specific to 3026; only a Feb 2022 generic MLCC reference

Business

Holy Stone (full legal name: Holy Stone Enterprise Co., Ltd.; founded 1981, HQ Taipei, listed TWSE) is a hybrid: it manufactures its own multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) under the IHHEC brand at Longtan and Yilan (Taiwan), and acts as an authorised distributor for active and passive components from third-party suppliers across Asia. The hybrid model means lower customer concentration than pure-play MLCC peers, but the company does not break out manufacture-vs-distribution revenue in public English filings — the single biggest information gap. Profile assumption: in-house MLCC is ~25–35% of total revenue, distribution the balance.

Segments (FY2024 product mix)

• Passive components (~39%) — IHHEC in-house MLCC plus distributed passives; the AI-server-leveraged line. Mid-spec MLCCs, mostly X7R / X8R automotive temperature range, 25V–500V, 0201–1210 packages. ASP TWD 0.05–5/unit (auto-grade 3–5x consumer-grade). End apps: automotive (BMS, infotainment, EV power), AI server PSUs, LED drivers, industrial PoE.
• Active components (~22%) — distribution-only; diodes, MOSFETs, SiC, touch controllers, Azoteq capacitive-sensing ICs. Single-digit gross margin. Strategic role: one-stop shop for Asia OEMs.
• System modules (~17%) — assembled modules for OEM customers; disclosure very thin.
• Other (~22%) — catch-all: IC, memory wholesale, biotech, medical wholesale (incl. "wholesale of pharmaceuticals, western medicine, and medical devices"). Legacy diversification worth scrutinizing.

Customers (none disclosed by name; estimates from industry reporting)

• AI server power-supply makers — Delta (2308.TW), Lite-On (2301.TW), Chicony Power (6285.TW); single-to-low-single-digit % each, growing. This is the AI lever.
• Automotive Tier-1s (unnamed) — single-digit %; IATF 16949 qualified; gained ~1.5% (150bps) share in automotive MLCC per industry reports.
• Distribution OEM channel — long tail across industrial / LED / consumer.
• Concentration: top-1 customer probably below 10% (lower than pure-play peers) — a genuinely good feature; to verify against the Chinese-language annual report. Hyperscaler exposure is two steps removed (Holy Stone → PSU OEM → server OEM → hyperscaler), so a capex pause propagates with a 1–2 quarter lag.

Moat / competitive position

Modest. The hybrid manufacture+distribution model is a business-model choice, not a defensible moat — Yageo could replicate it via M&A; Murata could open distribution arms; agency lines can be unilaterally cancelled by suppliers. In-house production is mid-spec automotive grade (IATF 16949), not at the leading-edge dielectric/ultra-thin-layer tier where Murata and Taiyo Yuden dominate. Holy Stone runs ~1.0–1.5 µm minimum dielectric thickness vs ~0.5 µm state-of-the-art (Murata) — roughly one generation behind. Its win is at the power-supply layer (mid-voltage 50–500V, mid-capacitance 1–10 µF, high-temperature X7R/X8R MLCCs) where Tier-1 capacity is fully booked. Business-quality 3-test verdict: Mediocre — a cyclical mid-tier passive maker, not a high-quality compounder; owning it requires getting the cycle right, not the company right.

Footprint

• Longtan plant (Taiwan) — built 1999, MLCC manufacturing, mature
• Yilan Lize plant (Taiwan) — MLCC manufacturing, being expanded for high-power AI-server MLCC
• Hokkaido R&D center (Japan) — new production line being built out; first Japan plant
• Sales/distribution offices: Taipei (HQ), Shenzhen, Suzhou, Shanghai, plus US (Holy Stone International) and Europe (Holy Stone Europe) arms
• Certifications: ISO 9001, ISO 14001, IATF 16949 (automotive), QC 080000
• Distribution agency for Azoteq (South African sensing ICs) in Asia — confirmed; references to carrying Murata/TDK/Taiyo Yuden product into select channels are not separately disclosed in English IR (flagged assumption). No formal JVs.

Financials

Income statement & margins (NT$ millions, FY ends Dec)

Metric	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	LTM (Q4'25)	FY2026E
Revenue	15,071	13,240	12,786	13,427	13,643	16,000–17,500 (mgmt +20–30% passive)
Revenue YoY %	—	-12.1%	-3.4%	+5.0%	+6.7%	+19–30%
Gross profit	3,135	2,292	2,089	2,520	2,734	~3,300
Gross margin %	20.8%	17.3%	16.3%	18.8%	20.0%	~20%
EBIT	1,504	899	1,173	1,295	1,822	~2,100
EBIT margin %	10.0%	6.8%	9.2%	9.6%	13.4%	~13%
Net income	1,231	851	973	1,092	1,288	~2,100
Net margin %	8.2%	6.4%	7.6%	8.1%	9.4%	~12%
Diluted EPS (TWD)	7.31	5.08	5.80	~6.58	6.51 (yf TTM)	~12.88 (yf fwd)

Gross margin recovered from the FY2024 trough of 16.3% to FY2025 18.8% (and 20.0% LTM), still below the FY2022 peak of 20.8%. The mix-shift story is just starting.

Quarterly second-derivative

	Q1'25	Q2'25	Q4'25	Q1'26 (actual)
Revenue (NT$M)	3,402	3,272	3,320	~3,623
Revenue YoY %	n/a	n/a	+3.9%	+6.4%
Net income (NT$M)	278	230	303	475
Net margin %	8.2%	7.0%	9.1%	13.1%
EPS (TWD)	1.66	1.38	n/a	2.00

Q3 2025 not surfaced in the yfinance series (data-limitation flag). Revenue YoY second derivative is positive (+3.9% → +6.4%); margin second derivative is strongly positive (8.2% → 9.1% → 13.1%). Q1 2026 EPS implies a ~TWD 8.00 annualized run-rate if margins merely hold; the yfinance forward EPS of TWD 12.88 requires margins to keep expanding AND revenue to accelerate — a heroic combination.

Incremental margin (the pivot)

Q4'25 vs Q4'24: incremental GM ~81%, incremental net margin ~60%. Q1'26 vs Q1'25: incremental GM ~90% (est.), incremental net margin ~89% (est.). If incrementals sustain at 50%+, FY2026 EPS prints north of TWD 12 easily; if they revert toward the ~30% historical mid-spec norm, FY2026 EPS lands closer to TWD 9–10. Forward P/E ranges 33x–48x depending where incrementals settle.

Cash flow & balance sheet (NT$ millions)

Metric	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	LTM
Operating cash flow	1,245	1,604	1,611	1,080	1,217
Capex	-1,039	-639	-455	-271	~-200
Free cash flow	206	965	1,156	809	1,018
FCF margin %	1.4%	7.3%	9.0%	6.0%	7.5%
Cash + ST inv	3,603	3,436	5,109	5,584	5,465
Total debt	3,784	3,059	3,334	3,644	2,885
Net debt	181	-377	-1,775	-1,940	-2,580
ROE (TTM)	12.7%	8.7%	9.7%	10.7%	12.5%
ROIC	~10%	~6%	~8%	~8.5%	~9%

Net cash discrepancy across fragments: the profile reports FY2025 net cash ~TWD 1.0B (cash 4.6B vs total debt 3.64B); the deep-dive LTM shows net cash improved to ~NT$2.6B (total cash 5,465 vs total debt 2,885). Both retained. Balance sheet is sound either way.

• ROIC ~9% LTM marginally above estimated WACC ~8% (cost of equity ~9.5%, cost of debt 3%, ~60/40 mix); below WACC at the FY2023–FY2024 trough (~6%). Classic cyclical economics — creates value at the top, breaks even or destroys it at the bottom.
• The NT$3B (~US$94M) capex over 2–3 years (Hokkaido + Yilan) is fundable from net cash + FCF — no equity raise in base case. Share count flat at 165.89M since FY2022 (no buybacks, no issuance, no convertibles/warrants).
• Red flags: working-capital build (receivables jumped from NT$3.09B to NT$3.78B in FY2025, the main reason OCF fell from NT$1.6B to NT$1.08B and FCF compressed); 84.5% dividend payout in a capex year; declining R&D intensity (NT$463M / 3.5% of revenue in FY2023 → NT$272M / 2.0% in FY2025).

Industry landscape

MLCCs are the most-used passive components in modern electronics — a single AI server consumes 30,000–50,000 MLCCs vs ~5,000 in a smartphone; each EV uses ~10,000 vs ~3,000 in an ICE car. Global MLCC TAM ~US$13–15B (2024), 7–10% CAGR to 2030 (Yole, TrendForce); the AI-server sub-segment grows 20–30%+ YoY off a small base (5–10% of TAM today). Holy Stone SAM US$3–5B; global MLCC share ~1–2%. Tier-1 Japan/Korea (Murata ~35%, Samsung Electro-Mechanics ~20%, Taiyo Yuden ~13%, TDK ~10%) own ~75–85% and dominate high-spec; Tier-2 (Yageo ~13%, Walsin ~5%, Holy Stone ~1–2%) hold mid-spec; Tier-3 China (Fenghua, Sunlord, Eyang) ~10% and rising on local-content push. The cycle is early-mid up-cycle (~12–15 months from the FY2024 trough) with high-spec shortage through 2026 and a mid-spec glut risk in 2027–2028 if all announced Tier-2 + China capacity ramps at once. Key upstream chokepoint: barium-titanate (BaTiO₃) dielectric powder, concentrated in 2–3 Japanese suppliers (Sakai Chemical 4078.T, Nippon Chemical 4092.T) — flagged as an under-priced pick-shovel alternative.

See sector page: passives-mlcc

Management

Jing-Rong Tang (唐金榮) — Chairman & President since 1994 (32 years dual role). Bachelor in Electronic Engineering, Tatung University; prior manager at Panasonic Sales Taiwan. The combined Chair+President role has never been separated — a standing governance flag. Other executives: Shih-Yun Shen and Shao-Kuo Huang (executive directors, tenure not disclosed). No publicly identified CFO or COO — the executive team appears small and Tang-centric; the absence of a visible successor is itself a flag.

The single most interesting diligence fact: Tang simultaneously chairs three public Taiwan companies — Holy Stone Enterprise (3026.TW, MLCC), eGalax_eMPIA Technology (3556.TT, touch controllers) and Holy Stone Healthcare (4194.TW, biopolymer drug delivery, a consolidated subsidiary). Holy Stone distributes eGalax_eMPIA products — a textbook related-party transaction (RPT) by definition, whose arms-length pricing cannot be verified without the Chinese-language related-party schedule. The 3026 "Other" segment includes medical wholesale, overlapping the Healthcare subsidiary's space, raising a second inter-company-pricing question.

Ownership / alignment: Insider ownership 22.2% (per yfinance) sums Tang's direct holding + four Tang-family investment vehicles — All-Logic International, Lung Ko Investment, Lin Tan Investment (holds a board seat as corporate director via representative Fang-Ming Lo), and Fang Hao Investment — plus a CTBC Bank trust for Tang. At TWD 433.5 the Tang-family aggregate is worth ~TWD 16B (~US$500M) — real, large skin in the game, but distributed across three listings, so capital-allocation incentives are not solely a function of 3026's stock price. Institutional ownership 7.4% (Vanguard via JPMorgan custodian; Fubon Life Insurance).

Board: 9 directors — 5 inside / 4 independent (44% independent, below the 50% good-practice bar but Taiwan-compliant). Independents: Ken-Yi Cheng (Audit Committee Chair), Chu-Yang Chien, Jen-Wei Ko, Jui-Chu Li (added 2025). Tang-Ming Wu sits as a director — same surname as the Chair but no family relationship disclosed (itself a soft flag); ex-Deloitte Taiwan, chairs Oxy Young Inc., supervisor of Linkage Electric. No dual-class shares, no poison pill.

Capital allocation: No material M&A in 5+ years (organic growth — positive, no balance-sheet blow-ups). No buybacks ever — share count flat at 165.89M since FY2022; management does not repurchase at any multiple (didn't buy at the TWD 75–100 lows in late 2024). Pro-cyclical capex (NT$1.04B at the FY2022 peak → NT$271M trough by FY2025 → NT$3B committed FY2026–2027) — worse than counter-cyclical but typical of the industry. Dividend payout 84.5%, high for a capex year; the Tang-family cash-flow expectation (~TWD 188–200M/year in dividends to the family at the current payout) is likely the binding constraint on capital-allocation flexibility. Capital-allocation timing test: Neutral. Deep-dive capital-allocation grade: B-.

Compensation: Disclosure gap — director/executive comp is filed only via Taiwan MOPS in Chinese; SBC is minimal at Taiwan mid-caps. Cannot verify.

Litigation/enforcement: No SEC actions (not US-listed), no surfaced Taiwan FSC/SFB enforcement, no bankruptcy, no proxy contests or activist filings — but from English-only sources, so treat as "no public English-language record," not "clean."

Overall management grade: C+ / Yellow — aligned by ownership, entrenched by structure, opaque on key disclosures. Dimension ratings: Skin in the Game Green; Holdings Concentration Yellow; Shell/Cross-Holdings Yellow; Capital Allocation Yellow; Compensation Unknown; Credibility provisional Yellow (B); Governance Yellow; Litigation Green-Yellow. Succession is the single most under-priced governance variable — no named successor after 32 years; a Tang health/availability event would likely drop the stock 20–30% on announcement alone, a tail risk the ~66x multiple does not pay for.

Catalysts & risks

Catalysts (bull)

• Near-term (0–12 mo): Q2 2026 earnings (early August) — the first real read on whether the +20–30% passive guide is tracking and whether the ~90% Q1 incremental margin holds; monthly revenue prints (June, July, August); Hokkaido capex-deployment updates; any sell-side initiation (likely a buy, given momentum).
• Medium-term (1–3 yr): Hokkaido production line commissioning (2027); Yilan Lize expansion fully ramped (2027); automotive MLCC share milestone (toward 3% global?); possible bolt-on M&A using net cash (roll up smaller Asia distributors).
• Structural tailwinds: AI server power-density demand (2025–2027), EV electrification, IoT, China local-content push (lifts all Taiwan passives), Japan capacity discipline keeping mid-spec pricing healthy, Yageo's M&A track record (Pulse, Kemet) lifting Taiwan-passive multiples broadly.

Bull case

FY2026 passive revenue +20–30% + margin expansion (Q1 2026 net margin 13% vs 8.2% prior year) drive EPS toward TWD 12–13 in FY2026 and potentially TWD 15+ in FY2027 as Hokkaido + Yilan ramp; a re-rate toward Tier-2 peer multiples (~25x forward) on FY2027 EPS ~TWD 15 = ~TWD 375.

Risks (bear)

1. Valuation overshoot reversion — at ~66x TTM the stock is priced perfectly for the bull guide; a single Q2 print missing on margin compresses the multiple hard. Downside 30–50% in a quarter.
2. Mid-spec MLCC glut 2027–2028 — Holy Stone + Yageo + Walsin + China all ramping into the same window; classic late-cycle setup.
3. Tang governance/succession event — 32-year Chair+President, no public successor; any health/availability event = 20–30% drop on announcement alone.
4. China commodity ASP pressure — Fenghua / Sunlord local-content push structurally erodes commodity MLCC pricing.
5. Hokkaido execution risk — first Japan production line; operational learning curve; needs to land into the AI demand window (~2027).
6. Distribution-arm margin pressure — agency lines can be unilaterally cancelled by suppliers; low-margin and tied to broader semi demand.
7. Currency — TWD/JPY/USD volatility hits both revenue and Japanese-input costs.
8. Single-analyst coverage — no functioning sell-side anchor (stale TWD 160 PT); price discovery driven by retail/domestic momentum flow — an unstable equilibrium.
9. Substrate-embedded capacitors — emerging tech that could remove discrete MLCCs from the board 5–10 years out (Murata involved).

What makes the thesis wrong: Q2 2026 incremental margins reverting toward 30% (vs Q1's ~90%) — i.e., Q1 was a mix benefit, not a structural shift. Bear price target: TWD 200–220 (−50%) combining a hyperscaler capex pause + margin reversion + multiple compression.

Behavioral audit (checklist): FOMO, confirmation bias, narrative seduction, and recency bias all triggered — 4 of 6 traps flagged. The stock's +38% two-week run is the single strongest signal that buying at TWD 433.5 would be a behavioral mistake regardless of business quality.

Valuation / DCF

Multiples vs peers (deep-dive / checklist)

Company	Ticker	P/E TTM	Fwd P/E	EV/EBITDA	EV/Rev	P/B
Murata	6981/6981	6981.T	~22x	~18x	~10x	~2.3x
Taiyo Yuden	6976/6976	6976.T	~30x	~16x	~7x	~1.2x
TDK	6762/6762	6762.T	~17x	~14x	~7x	~1.1x
Yageo	2327/2327	2327.TW	~20x	~16x	~12x	~2.5x
Walsin Tech	2492/2492	2492.TW	~30x	~20x	~12x	~2.3x
Holy Stone	3026.TW	66.6x	33.7x	46.5x	6.7x	10.6x

Holy Stone trades at the highest multiple on every metric vs every peer, despite being the smallest, lowest-margin, lowest-quality of the set — the bear case in a single table. Its own 10-year trailing P/E range is ~8x to ~25x, with the high-20s reached only at the FY2022 cycle peak; current ~66x is roughly 2.5x the prior cycle peak multiple.

Reverse-engineered expectations at TWD 433.5

• At 22x forward (Tier-1 multiple), the market implies FY2026 EPS of TWD 19.7 — ~3.0x the LTM EPS of 6.51, i.e., earnings need to roughly triple in one year.
• At 30x forward (Tier-2 quality multiple), implied FY2026 EPS is TWD 14.4 — earnings need to roughly double from LTM.

Fair value

• Realistic FY2026E EPS: TWD 10–13, midpoint TWD 12 (matches yfinance forward EPS 12.88).
• Fair value at 22x × TWD 12 = TWD 264; at 25x = TWD 300. Fair-value range TWD 264–320.
• Current price TWD 433.5 is 35–65% above fair value. Margin of safety is negative; would not buy 10–15% higher (TWD 477–500).
• 12-month target: TWD 280–320 (22–25x forward on FY2026E ~TWD 13 once the AI-cycle premium normalizes) — downside −26% to −35%.
• Bear target: TWD 200–220 (−50%).

Entry plan

Do not initiate at TWD 433.5 (target size zero). If valuation rationalizes to TWD 280–320, scale in over 3 tranches for a 1–2% position with a stop at TWD 240 (below the pre-rally consolidation); add ~1% at TWD 250 if the cycle thesis confirms in the Q2 print. Technical verdict: parabolic blow-off at a 52-week high — worst possible setup to enter on; wait for a pullback to TWD 350 minimum, ideally TWD 280–320. If insisting on MLCC AI-cycle exposure, prefer Sakai Chemical (4078.T) upstream BaTiO₃ pick-shovel, or Yageo (2327.TW) — both at much lower multiples.

Decision log

• 2026-05-20 — /profile written (Register-D company profile). Established the hybrid-model framing and the manufacture-vs-distribution disclosure gap.
• 2026-05-21 — /deep-dive verdict: AVOID at TWD 433.5 — wait for a 30%+ pullback or thesis change. 12-month target TWD 280–320 (−26% to −35%). Conviction Medium-High on direction, Low on timing. Capital-allocation grade B-.
• 2026-05-21 — /mgmt-dd verdict: Overall management grade C+ / Yellow. Aligned by ownership (22.2%, ~US$500M), entrenched by structure (3 chairmanships, 4 family vehicles, RPT via eGalax distribution), opaque succession. No red flags rising to fraud, but "absence of evidence, not evidence of absence" (English-only sources). Succession is the highest single governance risk.
• 2026-05-21 — /checklist (pre-buy) verdict: PASS at current price (TWD 433.5). FundamentEdge gates 1 of 5 PASS (3 FAIL, 1 cannot evaluate). 4 of 6 behavioral traps flagged. Scorecard 4 Yes / 4 No / 1 Partial / 1 Zero-sized. Watch for a TWD 280–320 entry with a TWD 240 stop. The single thing that must go right: Q1's ~90% incremental GM must be sustained.
• 2026-05-23 — MLCC sector handoff: Holy Stone scored Hard Pass 12/30 (Tier-2/3 mid-tier profile + Crowding 1/5 + stale single-analyst PT). Hit +10% limit-up at TWD 476.5 on 23 May.
• Net stance: AVOID / PASS at current price; wait-and-watch (not a short). The binary event is Q2 2026 earnings (early August) — incremental margin is the credibility test.

Sources

Consolidated from the following research fragments (all dated 2026-05-20 / 2026-05-21):

• 3026.md — prior canonical entity hub (MLCC swarm context, briefings, peer set 2327 Yageo / 2492 Walsin / 6976 Taiyo Yuden / 6981 Murata)
• 3026-tw-profile.md — /profile (2026-05-20)
• 3026-tw-deep-dive.md — /deep-dive (2026-05-21)
• 3026-tw-mgmt-dd.md — /mgmt-dd (2026-05-21)
• 3026-tw-checklist.md — /checklist pre-buy (2026-05-21)

External sources cited across fragments:

• Yahoo Finance — 3026.TW (live data 2026-05-21, price TWD 433.5; insider 22.2%, institutional 7.4%)
• Holy Stone Enterprise IR — https://www.holystone.com.tw (monthly revenue + quarterly consolidated statements; Directors page; 2024Q4 Consolidated Financial Statements EN PDF)
• Holystonecaps.com — manufacturing & history
• Digitimes — Holy Stone AI-driven MLCC demand / 2026 revenue guide (Mar 2026); capacity expansion Hokkaido + Taiwan (Mar 2026)
• StockAnalysis — TPE:3026 company profile
• Marketscreener — Holy Stone shareholders & board; Jing-Rong Tang positions
• Holy Stone Healthcare — https://www.hshc.com.tw/en/about_us.php; eGalax_eMPIA — https://www.eeti.com/
• Passive-components.eu — China MLCC makers reach 10% share; Cytech Systems — Top MLCC Manufacturers
• Yole / TrendForce — MLCC TAM and forecasts; Research and Markets — BaTiO₃ MLCC CAGR
• SA mirror — Semiconductor Roundup 2022-02-21 (only MLCC-adjacent reference; no Holy Stone-specific coverage; no contradiction to flag)
• Peer wikis — ~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wiki/{2327, 2492, 6976, 6981}/

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Consolidation queue (merged 2026-05-30)

These fragment files were folded into this canonical page and stay live pending Pink's archive confirm.

• [ ] 3026-tw-mgmt-dd.md
• [ ] 3026-tw-checklist.md
• [ ] 3026-tw-profile.md
• [ ] 3026-tw-deep-dive.md
• [ ] 3026.md

Source updates (auto-maintained)

Intake (May 23, 26) - mops-diligence-2026-05-23

A May 2026 MOPS diligence exercise confirms that Holy Stone explicitly does NOT disclose its manufacture-vs-distribution revenue split in any English-language filing; the 39/22/17/22% product-category mix is not a proxy for margin-quality by source.

Relevant to your thesis: Closes the manufacture-vs-distribution gap as permanently unresolvable in English, directly reinforcing the AVOID verdict — the 66x trailing P/E is being applied to a business whose most important quality metric is undisclosed.

Source: intakefile://mops-diligence-2026-05-23.md

Drop/Bottleneck (May 21, 26) - global_passives_basket_comparison

The May 21 basket comparison scores Holy Stone 12/30 (Hard Pass, last of seven names), citing uncertainty in valuation (forward P/E ~32x best case) and awarding lowest possible marks on crowding and revision velocity at TWD 394.5.

Relevant to your thesis: Reinforces the existing Hard Pass stance and the 12/30 basket score already embedded in the wiki's Conviction note, confirming no change to direction.

Source: dropfile://Bottleneck/MLCC/global_passives_basket_comparison.pdf