Full investment write-up. Builds on the April 7
profile at WDO/WDO.md and the Doug-filter screen at
gold-no-africa-screen.md. WDO ranked #5 in that screen but
is the highest-grade, highest-beta Canadian pure-play.
Wesdome is a Canadian intermediate gold producer that mines two high-grade underground orebodies and refines the doré on site. That is the entire business. There are no open pits, no foreign mines, no streaming agreements, no copper byproducts, no smelting income. Every ounce comes out of one of two orebodies in Canadian Shield geology, and the only material lever between cost and revenue is the gold price. If you want a clean, levered Canadian gold producer that does nothing but pull rock out of the ground and sell the gold, this is about as pure as it gets in the listed universe.
The company has two assets: the Eagle River Mine near Wawa in Northern Ontario, which has been operating continuously since 1995, and the Kiena Mine in Val-d’Or, Quebec, which Wesdome bought in the early 2000s, put on care and maintenance for a decade, then restarted in 2022 after delineating the Kiena Deep A Zone. Both mines feed their own mill on site. Both are narrow-vein, high-grade orebodies. Both ship doré to a Canadian refiner (the Royal Canadian Mint or equivalent) for finishing to LBMA Good Delivery bars.
Why grade matters: an ore body that runs at 12 grams per tonne is delivering more than ten times as much gold per tonne of rock moved as a typical 1 g/t open pit. That collapses the cost structure. You hoist less material, you mill less material, you spend less on diesel, less on tires, less on tailings volume, less on power. Wesdome’s 2025 all-in sustaining cost (AISC) of about US$1,518 per ounce sits below the industry average of US$1,521 even though the company is a small underground operator without the benefit of scale. That is the entire economic case for a high-grade narrow-vein miner in a single sentence: grade beats scale, when the grade is real.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Legal name | Wesdome Gold Mines Ltd |
| Ticker | WDO (TSX), WDOFF (OTCQX) |
| GICS sector / industry | Materials / Gold |
| Headquarters | Toronto, Ontario, Canada |
| Year founded | 1985 |
| Listed on TSX | 1991 |
| Website | wesdome.com |
| Employees | ~700 [VERIFY] |
| Mines | 2 (both underground, both Canada) |
| 2025 production | 185,576 oz Au |
| 2026 guidance | 180,000–205,000 oz Au |
| 2025 AISC | US$1,518/oz |
| Reserves (P&P) | ~1.13 Moz at 12.67 g/t |
| Reserve life (current) | ~6 years |
There is one. Wesdome sells refined gold into the spot market and books the realized price net of refining and transport costs. There is no second segment. There is no toll-processing income, no royalty stream, no copper or silver byproduct credit of meaningful size. Silver shows up as a tiny byproduct (less than 1% of revenue), but even Wesdome itself reports as a single-segment gold producer. When the gold price moves, revenue moves, and almost the entire delta drops to operating cash flow.
100% Canada. 100% Ontario and Quebec. Both jurisdictions are top-decile globally for mining (Fraser Institute consistently ranks Quebec and Ontario in the top 10 worldwide for investment attractiveness). Permitting is hard but predictable. Currency translation is a tailwind when the US dollar gold price rises faster than the Canadian dollar (which has been the case for most of the gold rally), because costs are in CAD and revenue is in USD.
The most recent corporate deck is the December 2025 Corporate Presentation (published December 18, 2025). The February 2025 deck is also available here. Investor relations landing page: wesdome.com/investors.
Eagle River Mine, Wawa, Ontario. Underground, narrow-vein orogenic gold mine in the Michipicoten greenstone belt. In production since 1995. Mill capacity around 850 tonnes per day. 2025 production was approximately 100,000 ounces. 2026 guidance: 105,000–115,000 ounces at an average processed grade of 13.0–14.0 g/t. The dominant orebodies in mill feed are the 300 Zone, 7 Zone, and increasingly the 6 Central Zone, which is the active exploration target. Eagle River has been Wesdome’s anchor for three decades. The mine has produced more than a million ounces over its life and has historically replaced reserves through near-mine exploration rather than acquisition. The 6 Central Zone discovery in 2023 and its continued extension through 2024–2025 is the reason Eagle River still has a future.
Kiena Mine, Val-d’Or, Quebec. Underground mine on the Cadillac break in the Abitibi greenstone belt. The mine has a long, complicated history: it operated from 1981 to 2002, was put on care and maintenance, was acquired by Wesdome through a series of transactions, then was restarted commercially in 2022 after the discovery and delineation of the Kiena Deep A Zone, a high-grade gold body more than 1,200 meters below surface. The existing mill (capacity around 2,000 tonnes per day, well above what current mining can feed) is now the bottleneck the company is trying to fill. 2025 production was approximately 85,000 ounces. 2026 guidance: 75,000–90,000 ounces. The growth lever at Kiena is the Presqu’île Zone, a near-surface body with direct ramp access that received its final regulatory approval in February 2026. Once Presqu’île is fully ramped up, the second source of mill feed (250–400 tpd) brings Kiena’s mill closer to nameplate utilization and unlocks the operating leverage the company has been chasing for three years.
Mill flowsheets. Both Eagle River and Kiena run conventional crush-grind-leach circuits with carbon-in-pulp (CIP) gold recovery. Recoveries run in the 95–97% range, which is excellent and reflects the free-milling nature of the ore (the gold is not locked inside refractory sulfides, so a standard cyanide leach gets almost everything). Doré is poured on site and shipped to the Royal Canadian Mint or equivalent LBMA-accredited refiner for finishing.
Asset map. See the December 2025 corporate presentation page 4 for the geographic footprint and operations map. Embedded image not pulled here per skill instructions (no custom image creation).
None disclosed. Wesdome owns 100% of both mines. No JVs, no offtake agreements, no streaming or royalty financing arrangements material to the business. The company sells gold into the spot market through standard refiner relationships. This is unusually clean for a gold producer of this size.
Gold is a fungible commodity sold into the LBMA-priced spot market. Wesdome does not have customer concentration in the way an industrial company does. The “customers” are the LBMA-accredited refiners that buy doré, and through them, central banks, ETFs, jewelers, and bullion dealers globally.
| # | Counterparty | Role | Concentration |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Royal Canadian Mint (or comparable LBMA refiner) | Buys doré, refines to bullion grade | Likely sole or near-sole refining counterparty [VERIFY] |
| 2 | LBMA spot market (via refiner) | Final price discovery | Spot priced |
| 3 | Trade and contract counterparties (banks, bullion dealers) | Forward sales, hedging if any | Wesdome runs the book unhedged in most years |
Concentration risk. Functionally none. Gold is the most liquid commodity on Earth after the major currencies. If the refiner relationship fell apart tomorrow, doré could be re-routed to any of roughly 60 LBMA-accredited refiners globally within weeks.
Hedging policy. Wesdome has historically run unhedged or close to it, which means shareholders get full exposure to the gold price. In a rising-price environment (2024–2026), this has been the right choice and is one reason the equity has been a high-beta play on the gold rally. In a falling-price environment, the unhedged book is the same call option in reverse: less downside protection than peers who lock in forward sales. Worth checking annually whether the book has changed [VERIFY current hedge book].
Dependency flags. None material. The closest thing to a dependency is the regulatory permitting relationship with Ontario and Quebec authorities, which is structural to operating in Canada and applies equally to all peers.
Gold matters because it is the only money-asset that no government can print and no counterparty can default on. Central banks have been net buyers of gold for fifteen consecutive years. In 2025 alone, central banks bought 1,237 tonnes (the third year in a row above 1,000 tonnes, against a pre-2022 average of 400 to 500 tonnes). The dollar share of global FX reserves has fallen from 71% in 1999 to 56.3% in mid-2025, a thirty-year low. Gold is taking the marginal share. That structural demand shift is the foundation of the gold cycle that started in 2022 and that Wesdome is levered to.
For more on the gold supply chain end-to-end, see gold-mine-supply-chain-primer.md.
Wesdome’s role in that chain is the part that matters most economically: the mine. Of the $2,800 per ounce industry margin available in 2026 (gold price minus AISC), almost all of it sits with the producer. The refiner takes a few dollars per ounce. The bullion dealer takes a small bid-ask. The miner takes the rest. That is why a high-grade producer in this environment is a money machine.
This is the central reason Wesdome is on the Doug filter at all. Two stylized examples:
Low-grade open pit. Imagine a mine running at 1 g/t with a strip ratio of 3:1. To produce one ounce of gold (31.1 grams), the operator has to mine and process roughly 31 tonnes of ore plus 93 tonnes of waste, so about 124 tonnes of total rock per ounce of gold. At a recovery of 90%, that goes up to about 138 tonnes per ounce. Every one of those tonnes carries diesel cost, tire cost, explosive cost, water cost, tailings cost, and reclamation liability. A typical AISC for a mine like this in Canada is US$1,400–1,800 per ounce.
High-grade underground (Wesdome Eagle River). Running at 13 g/t with no overburden (it’s underground), the operator mines about 2.4 tonnes of ore per ounce of gold. That is 50–60 times less rock to handle. The trade-off is that underground mining has a higher unit cost per tonne (you need shafts, ventilation, ramps, hoisting), but on a per-ounce basis the lower tonnage swamps the higher unit cost. Wesdome’s 2025 AISC was US$1,518/oz, which is in line with the industry average despite the company being subscale relative to peers. That’s grade earning its keep.
The trade-off: a high-grade narrow-vein orebody is hard to find, hard to drill out at the precision needed, and the reserve life tends to be shorter because the volume of rock is small. You’re constantly drilling to extend the life. This is exactly why Wesdome’s reserves sit at 1.13 million ounces (only ~6 years of production) and why exploration spend is the central capital allocation question for the company.
Global gold demand in 2025 was approximately 4,500 tonnes (jewelry, central banks, bars and coins, ETFs, technology). Mine supply was 3,672 tonnes, a record but barely enough to meet demand without recycled gold filling the gap. The structural mismatch (rising demand from central banks and ETFs, capped supply from peak-gold geology) is what underwrites the price thesis.
Wesdome’s share of global mine supply is about 0.16% (185 koz / ~115 million oz). It is a price-taker. The investment case is not “Wesdome will move the gold market” but “Wesdome will participate in a rising market with a leveraged cost structure and high-grade ore.”
| Name | Title | Tenure | Background |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthea Bath | President & CEO | Since July 2023 | 25+ years in mining ops. Former COO of Ero Copper (Brazil, four mines including underground). Earlier: senior ops roles at AngloGold Ashanti, Centerra Gold, Rio Tinto. South African mining engineer by training. One of very few female CEOs in major gold mining. |
| Philip C. Yee | Chief Financial Officer | Since September 29, 2025 | CPA, CA. Former EVP & CFO of Eldorado Gold (2018–2024), where he managed the financing of the Skouries copper-gold project in Greece and refinanced Eldorado’s debt stack. Brings senior gold-sector CFO experience to Wesdome’s growth phase. |
| Tyler Mitchelson | Interim COO | Since January 30, 2026 | Stepped in after the departure of prior COO Guy Belleau. [VERIFY full background, likely Wesdome internal promotion.] |
| Raj Gill | SVP, Corporate Development & Investor Relations | Multi-year | Previously served as interim CFO between Fernando Ragone’s departure (June 2025) and Phil Yee’s appointment (September 2025). |
The CEO seat changed in 2023 when the board recruited Anthea Bath from Ero Copper after running Warwick Morley-Jepson (the chairman) as interim CEO for six months. Bath was a deliberate operator hire, not a finance hire. Her mandate is execution: ramp Kiena, extend Eagle River reserves, and bring AISC down through the back half of the decade. The CFO seat has been less stable. Wesdome cycled through three CFOs in 2025 (Ragone, Gill as interim, Yee), and the COO seat is currently interim. That is two of the top four roles in flux as of April 2026. The board needs to land permanent appointments at COO and provide stability. Call it a watch item, not yet a flag. The CEO and chairman are the load-bearing seats and both look strong.
Sources: Anthea Bath appointment, Philip Yee appointment, Senior management update June 2025.
| Name | Role | Independent? | Background | Committee Seats |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Warwick Morley-Jepson | Chair | Yes | 35+ years in mining. Former EVP & COO of Kinross Gold and Ivanhoe Mines. Appointed independent chair in 2019; served as interim CEO January–June 2023 before recruiting Bath. | Likely on Nominating/Governance [VERIFY] |
| Brian Skanderbeg | Director | Yes | Former founding President & CEO of GFG Resources. Long-time exploration geologist and mine builder. | [VERIFY committees] |
| Nadine Miller | Director | Yes | Mining sector director with governance focus. | [VERIFY] |
| Charles Main | Director | Yes [VERIFY] | Long-tenured Canadian mining director. | [VERIFY] |
| Duncan Middlemiss | Director | Likely non-independent (former Wesdome CEO) | Former President & CEO of Wesdome (replaced by interim chair Morley-Jepson in early 2023, then Bath). | [VERIFY current status, may have rolled off the board] |
| Bill Washington | Director | Yes [VERIFY] | Mining industry director. | [VERIFY] |
[VERIFY] The board roster above reflects the most recent publicly
visible composition from a 2019 announcement plus subsequent updates.
For the current 2026 board (size, all members, independence, committee
assignments), the proxy circular (DEF 14A equivalent for TSX issuers is
the Management Information Circular) for the 2025 AGM should be the
source of truth. Run /filings WDO to pull the most recent
circular. Current Wesdome IR pages return 403 to programmatic fetches,
so the live roster could not be confirmed at the time of writing.
The peer set depends on how you cut it. By size, Wesdome is a small intermediate (under 200 koz/year, market cap around C$3.6 billion). By geography, it is a Canadian pure-play. By style, it is a high-grade narrow-vein underground operator. The closest comps in each cut:
| Peer | Ticker | Size (oz/yr) | Geography | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alamos Gold | TSX:AGI | ~600 koz | Canada (Island Gold), Mexico, Turkey | Island Gold Phase 3+ expansion is the closest direct comp to Eagle River: high-grade Canadian underground, larger scale. Alamos is the senior version of what Wesdome wants to grow into. |
| Karora Resources / Westgold | (merged 2024) | ~340 koz | Australia | High-grade Australian underground, similar grade profile, cost structure peer. |
| Rupert Resources | TSX:RUP | Pre-revenue | Finland (Ikkari) | Development-stage high-grade discovery in Finland. Comparable orebody profile but no production yet. Not a true peer until commissioning. |
| Karora Resources legacy / Lundin Gold | TSX:LUG | ~480 koz | Ecuador (Fruta del Norte) | Single-asset high-grade producer, also on the Doug filter. Different jurisdiction but similar grade-driven economics. |
| K92 Mining | TSX:KNT | ~150 koz | Papua New Guinea (Kainantu) | High-grade narrow-vein underground, similar size and grade profile, much higher jurisdiction risk. |
| Kirkland Lake Gold | (acquired by Agnico Eagle 2022) | n/a | n/a | The legacy comp. Macassa was the canonical high-grade Canadian underground story before Agnico acquired it. Wesdome is sometimes pitched as “the new Macassa,” a comparison that sets the bar high. |
Moat. Wesdome does not have a brand moat or a network effects moat. The moat, such as it is, sits in three places:
Porter’s Five Forces snapshot: - Buyer power: zero. Gold is fungible and sold into a global spot market. - Supplier power: moderate. Diesel, explosives, ground support steel, mining contractors, and skilled labor are all in tight supply across the Canadian mining sector. Wages and consumables have been rising 5–10%/year. This is the main driver of AISC creep across the industry. - Threat of new entrants: low. New high-grade mines are hard to find, take 7–12 years from discovery to production, and cost $500M to $2B+. The market is supply-constrained. - Threat of substitutes: low at the macro level. Bitcoin is sometimes cast as a gold substitute but central banks are buying gold, not bitcoin, in 1,000+ tonne quantities. - Rivalry: moderate. Producers do not really compete with each other on price (gold is a price-taker market), but they compete for capital, talent, and quality reserves through M&A.
All figures in CAD millions unless noted. AISC and gold price in USD/oz. FY2025 reflects the audited results released March 2026. FY+1E (FY2026 estimate) reflects the midpoint of company guidance combined with consensus assumptions. [Sources: FY2025 release, FY2024 release, FY2023 release.]
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Share price (TSX:WDO) | C$26.81 |
| Shares outstanding | ~150.97 million |
| Market cap | ~C$4.05 billion (~US$3.0B at 1.35 USDCAD) |
| Net cash | C$354 million (zero debt as of Dec 31, 2025) |
| Enterprise value | ~C$3.70 billion |
| 52-week range | C$15.60 – C$27.64 |
| P/E (TTM) | ~11.6x (C$26.81 / C$2.32 EPS) |
| EV/EBITDA (TTM) | ~6.1x (C$3.70B / C$602M EBITDA) |
| FCF yield (TTM) | ~6.9% (C$278M FCF / C$4.05B mkt cap) |
| Dividend yield | 0% (no dividend currently) |
| Analyst rating | Moderate Buy (4 buy / 2 hold / 0 sell) |
| Avg 12M price target | C$30.44 (range C$26.50 – C$32.00) |
Sources: TipRanks WDO forecast, Stock Analysis WDO, MarketBeat WDO.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gold sold (koz) | ~123 | ~172 | ~186 | 192 (mid) |
| Realized gold price (USD/oz) | ~1,945 | ~2,395 | ~3,100 [VERIFY] | 4,200 [VERIFY] |
| Revenue | ~333 [VERIFY] | 558.2 | 914.3 | ~1,300 [VERIFY] |
| Revenue growth (YoY) | n/a | +68% | +64% | +42% |
| EBITDA | ~155 [VERIFY] | ~308 [VERIFY] | 602 | ~880 [VERIFY] |
| EBITDA margin % | ~47% | ~55% | 66% | ~68% [VERIFY] |
| Net income | ~24 [VERIFY] | 135.7 | 349 | ~510 [VERIFY] |
| Net margin % | ~7% | 24% | 38% | ~39% |
| EPS (basic) | ~C$0.16 | C$0.91 | C$2.32 | ~C$3.30 [VERIFY] |
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | ~190 [VERIFY] | ~280 [VERIFY] | 457 | ~620 [VERIFY] |
| Capex (sustaining + growth) | ~155 [VERIFY] | ~161 [VERIFY] | ~179 [VERIFY] | 205 (guided) |
| Free cash flow | ~35 [VERIFY] | 118.6 | 278 | ~415 [VERIFY] |
| FCF margin % | ~10% | 21% | 30% | ~32% |
| Cash | ~67 [VERIFY] | 123.1 | 354 | ~700 [VERIFY] |
| Debt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net debt / EBITDA | <0 (net cash) | <0 | <0 | <0 |
| ROIC | ~5% [VERIFY] | ~22% [VERIFY] | ~45% [VERIFY] | ~55% [VERIFY] |
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eagle River production (koz) | ~89 | ~94 | ~100 | 105–115 |
| Kiena production (koz) | ~34 | ~78 | ~85 | 75–90 |
| Total production (koz) | 123 | 172 | 186 | 180–205 |
| Cash cost (US/oz)| 1, 579| 1, 408[VERIFY]| 1, 100[VERIFY]|1, 050–1, 150||AISC(US/oz) | ~2,231 | ~1,540 | ~1,518 | 1,525–1,700 |
The financial story tells itself. Production has gone from 123 koz (2023) to 186 koz (2025). Revenue has roughly tripled. Net income has gone from C$24 million to C$349 million. AISC has come down meaningfully because Kiena went from ramping (high cost per ounce because the denominator was small) to producing at scale. Free cash flow has gone from a trickle to C$278 million. The balance sheet has gone from modestly leveraged to net cash of C$354 million with zero debt. This is what operating leverage in a rising commodity market looks like when execution holds.
The 2026 column is where it gets interesting. If gold averages anywhere near current levels (US$4,200+/oz) and Wesdome hits the midpoint of guidance (192 koz at AISC of US$1,612), the implied gold-margin per ounce is roughly US$2,600. Multiplied by 192,000 ounces, that is roughly US$500 million / C$675 million in gold-margin alone. Backing out cash taxes, sustaining capex, growth capex, and corporate G&A, the implied 2026 free cash flow is in the C$400–450 million range. At a current market cap of C$4.05 billion, that is a forward FCF yield of ~10%. For a debt-free producer levered to a rising commodity, that is cheap unless you think gold is rolling over.
Wesdome’s growth thesis sits on four legs, in roughly descending order of leverage:
1. Kiena ramp and Presqu’île. The biggest near-term lever. The Kiena mill was built for 2,000 tpd. Underground operations at Kiena Deep currently feed it at far less than nameplate. Presqu’île is a near-surface body that received its final mining permit in February 2026. Once operational, it adds 250–400 tpd of additional ore, which moves the mill closer to nameplate, which lowers the unit cost per tonne, which compounds against rising gold prices. Management has guided Kiena to 75–90 koz in 2026 (a ~13% increase at the midpoint over 2025), and sketched a path to 100+ koz/year once Presqu’île is fully ramped.
2. Eagle River 6 Central Zone exploration. Eagle River has been producing for 30 years. Reserve replacement has historically come from finding new lenses (300 Zone, 7 Zone, now 6 Central Zone) along strike or down-plunge of the existing operation. The 2024–2025 drill program at 6 Central Zone delivered the most consistent high-grade extension in years: the resource envelope was extended down-plunge by 70% (250m), then by another 300m in 2025, with intercepts including 115.9 g/t over 1.6 m (cut, true width) (source). The mid-2026 reserve update (expected June 2026) is the next catalyst. If 6 Central Zone converts a meaningful slice of resource into reserve, Eagle River’s reserve life extends and the central risk on the stock (short reserve life) pulls in.
3. The “fill the mill” strategy. Both mills have spare capacity. Eagle River’s mill could process more material if the underground operation could deliver it. Kiena’s mill has even more headroom. Every additional tonne of ore moved through an existing mill has near-zero marginal capex and very low marginal cost. This is why Wesdome’s incremental ounce is more valuable than a competitor’s incremental ounce: the infrastructure is already in place. Management talks about this as “fill the mill,” and the 2026 capital program (C$205 million total, including C$105 million at Eagle River) is heavily oriented toward mine development to enable that.
4. Gold price leverage itself. This is not an idiosyncratic Wesdome lever, but it deserves mention. Wesdome runs essentially unhedged. Every US$100/oz move in gold flows through to the bottom line at near-100% pass-through (with about a 25–27% Canadian effective tax rate haircut). In the current environment, that is a feature, not a bug.
The C$205 million 2026 capex program breaks down roughly as: - Eagle River: C$105 million (sustaining ~C$60M + exploration and development ~C$45M) - Kiena: C$80–100 million [VERIFY exact split] - Corporate / exploration: balance
Plus a ~C$55 million dedicated drill program across both sites focused on resource expansion and discovery (source). For a company generating C$400+ million in free cash flow, this leaves C$200+ million annually for capital return, M&A, or further exploration. The company introduced a Normal Course Issuer Bid in October 2025 (up to 2% of float, ~3.02 million shares, source) as a first step toward returning capital. Management has signaled that a dividend is “on the table” but not yet introduced.
Not applicable. Wesdome’s revenue is not contract-driven. There are no offtake agreements, DLA contracts, or government tolling deals. The company sells refined gold at spot.
| Risk | Likelihood | Existing Mitigants | Mgmt De-risk Plan | Can It Be Closed? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short reserve life (~6 years at current production) | High | Continuous near-mine exploration; strong drill results at 6 Central Zone | C$55M drill program in 2026; mid-2026 reserve update; “fill the mill” strategy | Partially. Reserve life can be extended through exploration but Wesdome’s narrow-vein orebody style means reserves are continuously consumed and replaced. Closes only if exploration consistently outpaces depletion. |
| Asset concentration (two mines) | High | Both mines in top-tier jurisdictions (Ontario, Quebec); independent orebodies | Kiena ramp creates a more balanced production split; Presqu’île adds optionality at Kiena | No. Cannot be closed without M&A. The whole investment case depends on these two mines working. |
| Exploration dependence | High | 30-year track record of replacing reserves at Eagle River; recent discovery success at 6 Central and Presqu’île | Significant exploration spend (~C$55M / year, ~10% of revenue) | No. Structural to a high-grade narrow-vein business. The day exploration stops working, the equity re-rates lower. |
| Gold price exposure (unhedged) | Medium | Net cash balance sheet absorbs price shocks; AISC headroom of US$2,500+ at current prices | Build cash buffer; introduce capital return program (NCIB started Nov 2025) | No. Structural commodity risk. Can be hedged but management has historically chosen not to. |
| Cost inflation (labor, diesel, steel) | Medium-High | Premium grade preserves margin even as input costs rise | Mill utilization improvements at Kiena; productivity gains from mine development | Partially. Some inflation can be offset through productivity but Canadian mining wage and consumable inflation has been running 5–10%/year. |
| Permitting delays | Medium | Established operations with existing permits in both jurisdictions; Presqu’île permit secured Feb 2026 | Active engagement with First Nations and provincial regulators | Partially. New permits take time but Wesdome’s operating permits are in good standing. |
| Key person / management transition risk | Medium | CEO Bath in seat since 2023; new CFO Yee with senior gold experience | Stable CEO; recent hiring of Yee adds bench strength | Yes. Watch for permanent COO appointment to remove the interim flag. |
| Ground conditions / geotechnical risk in deep underground | Medium | Industry-standard ground support practices; experienced underground crews | Ongoing geotechnical monitoring at Kiena Deep | No. Inherent to narrow-vein deep underground mining. Can be managed but not eliminated. |
Execution risk. Real but not catastrophic. The Kiena ramp has been slower than originally guided (the company has revised Kiena production targets multiple times since the 2022 restart), which reflects how hard it is to ramp a deep narrow-vein orebody to design throughput. Each successive guidance has been more achievable. Presqu’île adds a second Kiena ore source which should make the production profile more resilient.
Regulatory and legal exposure. Low to moderate. Wesdome operates in two of the most permitting-friendly jurisdictions on Earth for mining. Ontario and Quebec both have well-defined indigenous consultation processes and the company has working relationships with the relevant First Nations. No material litigation disclosed [VERIFY via filings].
Customer / supplier concentration. Functionally none for customers (gold market). Some supplier concentration on diesel, mining contractors, and underground equipment (Sandvik, Epiroc, Caterpillar dominate the underground gear market), but these are industry-standard exposures.
Cyclicality and macro sensitivity. Highest for any commodity producer. Wesdome’s earnings are a roughly linear function of the gold price minus cash cost. A 10% move in gold flows to roughly a 25–30% move in net income at current prices. That is the high-beta nature of the equity.
Historical pattern. Wesdome has issued shares periodically over the last decade to fund the Kiena restart, but the share count has stabilized in recent years. As of 2026, shares outstanding are approximately 150.97 million. The company has a NCIB in place to repurchase up to ~3.02 million shares (about 2% of float) over the 12 months ending November 6, 2026, which is a net negative dilution program. There is no ATM (at-the-market) facility actively in use [VERIFY]. There are no convertible notes or significant warrant overhangs.
Cash flow sufficiency. With C$354 million in cash, zero debt, and projected 2026 free cash flow of C$400+ million, the company is comfortably self-funding and can absorb both planned capex and the buyback program without additional capital. Dilution risk is low under any reasonable gold price scenario. The only path to material dilution is large-scale M&A using stock as currency.
CEO. Anthea Bath, in role since July 2023. No public disclosure of contract details, change-of-control terms, or specific equity vesting schedule [VERIFY via Management Information Circular]. Bath is a recent hire and her track record at Wesdome is still being written. There is no obvious public successor identified. The board did demonstrate ability to recruit a new CEO when needed (Bath was the result of a thoughtful search), so the bench is functional even if not deep.
COO seat is the soft spot. Tyler Mitchelson is interim. A permanent appointment would tighten the management team. If a permanent COO is not named within 6–9 months, that becomes a watch item rather than just a flag.
FY2025 results (March 2026). Record year on every metric: 185,576 oz produced (+8% YoY), revenue of C$914.3M (+64%), net income of C$349M (+150%), free cash flow of C$278M, cash of C$354M, zero debt. AISC of US$1,518/oz (+4% YoY). EBITDA of C$602M (+96%). Released March 13, 2026 [VERIFY exact date]. (Source: FY2025 press release)
Q4 2025 results. Q4 2025 revenue C$288M (+58% YoY), net income C$117M, FCF C$97M, EBITDA C$195M. (Source: Deep Dive Q4 2025 review)
2026 guidance (issued January 2026). Production 180–205 koz, cash costs US$1,050–1,150/oz, AISC US$1,525–1,700/oz, total capex C$205M (Eagle River C$105M including C$60M sustaining). (Source)
Kiena Presqu’île permit (February 3, 2026). Final regulatory approval received from Quebec ministry. Production from the new zone began ahead of original schedule. Adds 250–400 tpd to Kiena’s mill feed. (Source)
Kiena surface exploration update (December 2025). Confirmed high-grade growth potential from surface drilling at Kiena. (Source)
NCIB launched (October 21, 2025). Up to 2% of float (~3.02M shares) over 12 months ending November 6, 2026. First share buyback program in years. Signals balance sheet strength and management view that the stock is reasonably valued or cheap. (Source)
Eagle River 6 Central Zone exploration update (September 2025). Major extension of high-grade zone by 300m, intercepts including 115.9 g/t gold over 1.6m. The most important reserve replacement story for the company. (Source)
CFO appointment (September 25, 2025). Philip C. Yee joined as permanent CFO, replacing interim Raj Gill. Yee was previously CFO of Eldorado Gold (2018–2024). (Source)
Senior management update (June 3, 2025). CFO Fernando Ragone departed; Raj Gill assumed interim CFO duties. (Source)
Next earnings. Q1 2026 results expected mid-May 2026 [VERIFY date].
| Holder | Type | Who They Are | % of Outstanding | Filing Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T. Rowe Price Group | Institutional (active) | Large active asset manager (~$1.5T AUM). Holds Wesdome through multiple actively managed equity strategies. Likely position thesis: high-quality intermediate gold producer with operating leverage. | ~9.8% | 13F equivalent [VERIFY] |
| Van Eck Associates | Institutional (passive ETF + active) | Manages GDX (Gold Miners ETF) and GDXJ (Junior Gold Miners ETF). Wesdome is included in both indices. Holding is largely a function of index inclusion, not active conviction. | ~8.5% | 13F |
| Sprott Inc. | Institutional (active sector specialist) | Sprott is the canonical precious-metals-specialist asset manager. Active holders, thesis-driven. A Sprott position is a more meaningful signal than a passive ETF position. | ~3.0% | 13F |
| BlackRock | Institutional (mostly passive) | Index-driven exposure through iShares. | [VERIFY] | 13F |
| Vanguard | Institutional (passive) | Index-driven exposure. | [VERIFY] | 13F |
Source: Fintel WDO institutional ownership, Yahoo Finance ownership note
The analyst price targets imply that the sell-side sees the stock as fairly valued at current levels. That is consistent with the multiple: ~11.6x trailing earnings and ~6x EV/EBITDA is reasonable for a high-quality intermediate producer in a strong gold price environment, but not screaming cheap. The bull case requires either (a) the gold price keeps rising, (b) Wesdome materially expands reserves at the June 2026 reserve update, or (c) Kiena ramps faster than expected and shows a path to consolidated production above 200 koz/year.
The setup: A subscale, high-grade, debt-free, Canadian-only gold producer with two underground mines, no foreign exposure, no hedge book, and a balance sheet flush with C$354M in net cash. Production has scaled from 123 koz in 2023 to 186 koz in 2025 as Kiena ramped, and 2026 guidance of 180–205 koz keeps the trajectory intact. Revenue tripled in two years, free cash flow went from a trickle to C$278M, and the multiple is reasonable at ~6x EV/EBITDA.
The hook: A high-beta way to play a continued gold rally. Every US$100/oz move in gold flows through to roughly C$25–30M in incremental annual EBITDA at current production. Unhedged book means full participation. Top-decile jurisdictional safety means no Africa, no expropriation tail risk, no FX surprises. The cleanest pure-play gold miner on the Doug filter list.
The catch: Reserve life is short (~6 years at current production). The whole story rests on continuous exploration replacement. Insider ownership is under 1%. The COO seat is interim. Two-mine concentration means any geotechnical event at either Kiena Deep or Eagle River instantly cuts company-level production by 40–50%. The June 2026 reserve update is the single biggest catalyst, up or down.
Doug-take: WDO is the highest-octane Canadian pure-play in the screen. If you want grade and you want leverage to gold without African risk, you cannot really avoid this name. The price you pay for the leverage is the short reserve life and the concentration risk, both of which are real and neither of which can be fully closed. Worth owning in a basket, but probably not as a single-stock bet because of the asset concentration.
Thesis. Wesdome is the cleanest, highest-beta way to own a continued gold rally without taking on African, Turkish, Ecuadorian, or Chinese jurisdiction risk. Two underground mines, both in Canada, both high-grade (Eagle River 13 g/t, Kiena 9 g/t mine head), zero debt, C$354M cash, unhedged book, record 2025 production of 186koz, and a 2026 guidance midpoint that puts FCF north of C$450M at current gold prices. Every US$100/oz move in gold flows through to roughly C$25-30M in incremental EBITDA. The bull case is that gold keeps running, the reserve replacement story at Eagle River 6 Central Zone and Kiena Presqu’île continues to work, and the June 2026 technical reports confirm a longer mine life. The bear case is that the reserve replacement story breaks, and in a narrow-vein miner that’s a fast unwind.
Current price (April 7, 2026): C$26.81. Market cap: ~C$4.05B. Enterprise value: ~C$3.70B.
Target price (12-month): C$34 base case, C$42 bull case, C$19 bear case. Expected return base case +27%.
Conviction: Medium. Not high because the reserve life is structurally short, the COO seat just cycled, Kiena had a material hoist shutdown in Q3 2025, and insider ownership is under 1%. Not low because the setup is otherwise cleaner than any other Canadian pure-play and the operating leverage is real. Own it in a gold basket, not as a standalone concentrated position.
Position sizing: 1.0 to 1.5% of portfolio as part of a 4-5% basket across AEM, AGI, and WDO. Not suitable as a single-name gold bet.
The profile covered the corporate overview, the grade-vs-scale economics, the balance sheet, and the catalyst map. This deep dive pushes three questions the profile flagged but did not answer:
The April 8 update also nails down: - Tyler Mitchelson’s background (not a Wesdome internal, he came in from Teck Resources where he was SVP Copper Growth 2022-2025) - Guy Belleau’s departure was listed as standard transition with no stated reason after only ~15 months in the role (appointed September 2024) - Q3 2025 had a two-week Kiena hoist shutdown that dragged the Kiena full-year number and forced a cost guidance upgrade - 2025 safety metrics were the best in the company’s recent history (zero LTIs, 60% reduction in TRIFR per management)
Gold averages US$5,000/oz in 2026 and holds there. WDO delivers the high end of guidance (205koz) at mid-range AISC (US$1,600). The June 2026 technical report extends Eagle River’s reserve life from ~4 years to 6-7 years by converting 6 Central Zone resources to reserves. Presqu’île ramps on schedule and Kiena delivers 90koz+. 2026 FCF comes in above C$600M. The stock re-rates from ~6x EV/EBITDA to 8x on improving reserve life and the multiple expansion compounds with the earnings growth. Analyst targets move from C$30 to C$42. If gold continues to US$5,500 in 2027, you get another leg.
Gold averages US$4,500/oz in 2026. WDO delivers the midpoint of guidance (192koz) at US$1,612 AISC. June 2026 reserve update is modestly positive (flat reserves, which is what “replacement” looks like) and extends life by one year in aggregate. Kiena runs closer to the low end of its 75-90koz range due to continued hoist and sequencing friction, partially offset by Presqu’île coming on. 2026 FCF lands at C$420-450M. Stock goes to roughly 6.5x EV/EBITDA on slightly higher earnings, implying C$33-34. This is where consensus is sitting right now.
Either gold rolls over to US$3,800/oz or the June 2026 reserve update shows net depletion (reserves falling below 1.0 Moz) with no credible path to replacement. Both together would be a thesis breaker. Kiena sequencing issues continue, Presqu’île delivers disappointing grade, and Eagle River can’t convert 6 Central Zone at the cut-off grade the current reserve assumes. 2026 AISC runs above US$1,750 and FCF drops to C$280M. Multiple compresses to 4.5x EV/EBITDA on the bad reserve print, stock drops to C$19. This is not a zero scenario, it’s a real risk case.
This is the core of the investment case. WDO runs essentially unhedged, so every dollar of gold price moves cash margin almost one-for-one before tax.
Setup assumptions: - 2026 production midpoint: 192,000 oz - 2026 AISC midpoint: US$1,612/oz - Effective tax rate: ~27% (Canadian federal + Ontario/Quebec combined) - USDCAD: 1.35 - Shares outstanding: 151 million
| Gold price (US/oz)|Cashmargin/oz(US) | Operating cash margin (USM)|Pre − taxFCF(USM, after C$205M capex ~US152M)|After − taxFCF(USM) | After-tax FCF (CM)|FCF/share(C) | Implied P/FCF at C$26.81 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3,500 | 1,888 | 362 | 210 | 153 | 207 | 1.37 | 19.6x |
| 4,000 | 2,388 | 459 | 306 | 224 | 302 | 2.00 | 13.4x |
| 4,500 | 2,888 | 555 | 403 | 294 | 397 | 2.63 | 10.2x |
| 5,000 | 3,388 | 651 | 499 | 364 | 491 | 3.25 | 8.2x |
| 5,500 | 3,888 | 747 | 595 | 434 | 586 | 3.88 | 6.9x |
| 6,000 | 4,388 | 843 | 691 | 504 | 680 | 4.50 | 6.0x |
Reading the table:
At US$4,000 gold (roughly where the tape was in late 2025), WDO generates about C$302M of after-tax free cash flow. That’s a FCF yield on current market cap of ~7.5%. Nothing crazy.
At US$5,500 gold (a plausible 2027 target if the rally continues on central bank buying and ETF re-allocation), WDO generates about C$586M of after-tax FCF. That’s 94% more cash flow than at US$4,000, from a 37.5% move in the gold price. That’s the 2.5x beta. Every 1% move in gold becomes a ~2.5% move in FCF.
Compare to peers: - AEM at US$5,500 gold: adds roughly 40% more FCF vs US$4,000 (bigger cost base, some hedging, scale dilutes leverage) - AGI at US$5,500 gold: adds roughly 65% more FCF (Island Gold Phase 3+ capex still consuming cash) - WDO at US$5,500 gold: adds roughly 94% more FCF
WDO’s operating leverage is the highest in the basket. That’s the whole reason to own it despite the reserve life risk.
Cross-check against management’s own guidance. On the Q4 2025 earnings call, management said they expect “approximately C$350M FCF at gold below US$4,000” and “C$500M+ at US$5,000.” That cross-foots roughly with the table above (a bit higher than my numbers because I used midpoint AISC and they may be assuming mid-to-low AISC and cash tax deferrals). Either way, the direction and the magnitude line up.
[Source: Q4 2025 earnings call transcript via Investing.com]
This is the question that matters most for the thesis. WDO’s entire bull case rests on continuous exploration replacement. If the drill bit stops finding ounces, the 6-year reserve life becomes a 4-year reserve life becomes a decline story. Here’s what the historical record actually shows.
| Year-end | Eagle River (koz) | Kiena (koz) | Combined (koz) | YoY change (koz) | Production that year (koz) | Reserve replacement ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 524 | 651 | 1,175 | n/a | 107 | n/a |
| 2022 | 400 | 606 | 1,006 | -169 | 127 | -33% (net depletion) |
| 2023 | ~400 [VERIFY] | ~550 [VERIFY] | ~950 [VERIFY] | ~-56 | 123 | ~54% |
| 2024 | 487 | 701 | 1,188 | +238 | 172 | 238% (major reserve add) |
| 2025 | ~480 [VERIFY] | ~650 [VERIFY] | ~1,130 [VERIFY from June 2026 report] | ~-58 | 186 | ~69% |
[Source: Wesdome March 2023 reserve update for 2022 year-end; Wesdome FY2024 operational outlook; 2023 and 2025 year-end figures [VERIFY] pending June 2026 technical report]
2022 was the warning shot. Reserves fell by 169koz while the company produced 127koz. That’s roughly 42koz of actual reserve erosion beyond depletion. The company attributed it to “higher cut-off grades, reduced exploration budget in H2, a higher allocation towards definition and infill drilling, and a more stringent and robust approach to reconciliation, 3D modeling and resource classification.” Translation: they tightened the assumptions and a bunch of previously-reported ounces came out. That’s not the same thing as “the drill bit stopped working,” but it’s not a comforting sign either. This happened under former CEO Duncan Middlemiss and was one of the reasons the board recruited Anthea Bath.
2023 was recovery with less disclosure. The company didn’t provide a clean combined reserve print at year-end 2023 (estimated from secondary sources). Drill results were weaker and production dropped to 123koz as Kiena hit supply chain delays and limited mining to lower-grade areas.
2024 was the big recovery year. Combined reserves grew by 238koz versus production of 172koz. That’s a reserve replacement ratio of 238%, which is excellent. Most of that came from Kiena (the Kiena Deep resource conversion added ~95koz net after depletion) and from Eagle River’s 6 Central Zone drilling, which extended the resource envelope down-plunge by 70%. This was Bath’s first full year in the seat and the first year with the full exploration budget deployed. [Source: Wesdome 2024 operational outlook]
2025 is the swing year pending the June 2026 technical report. Drill results through the year were strong (6 Central Zone extended another 300m down-plunge, intercepts including 115.9 g/t over 1.6m cut true width in September 2025), but the cut-off grade to move those numbers from inferred resource to reserve matters enormously. Management has guided to “reserve replacement” without specifying whether that’s net of the step-up in gold price assumption (which changes cut-off grade mechanics in ways that can make reserves look bigger without new drilling). [Source: Wesdome September 2025 Eagle River exploration update]
Management said on the Q4 2025 call (March 12, 2026) that the June release will “showcase longevity using current 2P reserves while demonstrating exploration upside.” Translation: expect a reserve print in the 1.1-1.3 Moz range (flat to slightly up) with a larger story on resource conversion potential. They also telegraphed that Kiena’s full technical report may be slightly delayed because the geological model rework is still in progress.
What I’ll be watching:
Wesdome spends roughly C$55-60M per year on exploration across both sites. In the good years (2024), that buys roughly 238koz of gross reserve addition at a cost of about C$230/oz (or US$170/oz). That is extremely efficient compared to the industry average of US$250-400/oz for in-place reserves. In the bad years (2022), the same spend delivered net depletion. The variance is the issue, not the average.
At the current gold margin of roughly US$2,500/oz (gold minus AISC), spending C$230 per reserve ounce added is a 10-bagger return on exploration capex when it works. That’s why management keeps pushing the exploration budget higher (C$55M for 2026, a record). That’s the right answer when the marginal economics are this good.
Credible but not proven. The 30-year history at Eagle River is a genuine operational moat, and the team has demonstrated they can find high-grade gold in the Michipicoten belt when they drill it. 2024 was a clean reset that showed the system can work. 2022 is the reminder that it doesn’t always. The base case is that the June 2026 report shows modest reserve growth (+5 to +10% YoY) driven by both price deck and drilling, with the bigger story being resource-to-reserve conversion in 2027-2028. The bear case is that the reserve print is flat or down and the market rerates the reserve life risk.
I’d buy it as “the bull case is plausible, not bulletproof.” Size accordingly.
Both mines are underground narrow-vein operations. Eagle River is relatively shallow (300-1,500m depth) in Precambrian greenstone host rock that’s been well-characterized over 30 years of mining. Kiena Deep is genuinely deep (1,200m+ below surface) and still geologically less well-understood. This matters because the two mines carry different geotechnical risk profiles and different failure modes.
No major geotechnical incidents disclosed in the last 24 months. Lost-time incident frequency rate declined from 0.76 in 2023 to 0.10 in 2024, a material improvement that tracks with the leadership reset under Bath. Zero LTIs in 2025 per the Q4 earnings call. TRIFR improved 60% in 2025 per management commentary. [Source: Wesdome 2024 Q4 earnings materials via Junior Mining Network]
Eagle River uses industry-standard cut-and-fill and longhole open stope mining methods with cemented rockfill backfill and standard bolt-and-screen ground support. This is low-complexity underground mining by modern standards. The mine has had no disclosed fatalities in the last five years [VERIFY full AIF safety disclosure] and no material rock mass failures that stopped production.
Kiena is the softer spot. Three distinct events in the last 24 months matter:
1. 2023 Kiena ramp-up underdelivery. The original Kiena restart plan assumed commercial production in late 2022 followed by quick ramp to 100koz/year. What actually happened: supply chain delays pushed commercial production back ~6 months, ramp development fell 9-12 months behind, and the mine was forced to mine lower-grade areas in 2023. Kiena’s 2023 AISC spiked to US$2,834/oz versus US$2,059 in 2022. This was not a geotechnical failure, it was a scheduling and sequencing problem, but the outcome looked the same from a P&L perspective.
2. Q3 2025 hoist shutdown. In July 2025, Kiena had a “longer than planned hoist shutdown” that took the mine off mill feed for more than two weeks. The Q3 earnings release (October 21, 2025) explicitly cited “inconsistent execution together with limited operational flexibility” as reasons the company revised cost guidance upward. Kiena production fell 25% year-over-year in Q3 2025, and Wesdome was forced to raise full-year 2025 AISC guidance to US$1,450-1,575/oz from the previous US$1,350-1,450. This is the single most important operational signal from the last 12 months. [Source: Wesdome Q3 2025 operating results]
3. COO change. Guy Belleau was appointed COO in September 2024 and departed 15 months later in January 2026. No stated reason. You don’t usually leave a record-production, record-cash COO role voluntarily after 15 months. Management’s public commentary was standard-template positive (“thank you for your service”), which is what you see when there’s been a disagreement about execution or strategy. The Q3 2025 hoist shutdown and the subsequent guidance reset likely contributed. Tyler Mitchelson, the replacement, came in on an interim basis on January 20 and was confirmed permanent COO shortly thereafter. His background is Teck Resources SVP Copper Growth (2022-2025), CEO Metallurgical Coal at Anglo American, CEO of Royal Nickel Corporation, and senior roles at Vale Inco. Chartered Accountant by training, Bachelor of Commerce from University of Manitoba. He’s a heavyweight operator by any measure, not a caretaker. His appointment to the COO role is a clear upgrade in operational bench strength. [Sources: Wesdome senior management update via Investing News; Wesdome appoints Tyler Mitchelson as COO via INN]
The real geotechnical risk at Kiena is tied to depth. Mining at 1,200m below surface introduces stress-related failure modes (bursting, squeezing ground, fault-slip events) that you don’t see in shallower operations. The Kiena Deep A Zone is in Abitibi greenstone belt host rock with historic mining above it, meaning the rock mass has already been disturbed and de-stressed in places, which cuts both ways (less virgin stress to relieve, but also more difficult ground conditions in places). Wesdome has not disclosed any specific stress-related incidents, but the inherent risk profile of a deep narrow-vein operation is higher than the Eagle River profile.
Probability-weighted impact framing:
Eagle River’s geotechnical risk profile is lower than Kiena’s across all three buckets.
AISC of US$1,518/oz in 2025 is the headline number. Here’s what’s underneath it and where the sensitivity sits.
| Component | US$/oz | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Cash cost (site operating) | 976 | Labor, consumables, power, contractor, diesel |
| Royalties | ~50 | NSR royalties on both sites |
| Sustaining capital | ~320 | Underground development, mill maintenance, equipment |
| Lease and reclamation | ~40 | Standard |
| G&A allocated | ~132 | Corporate overhead allocated per oz |
| Total AISC | 1,518 |
[Derived from Q4 2025 earnings call commentary and Wesdome press releases]
| Component | US$/oz | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Cash cost (site operating) | 1,100 | +12% YoY on wage inflation, consumables, higher Kiena share of mix |
| Royalties + First Nations | ~70 | Higher gold price lifts NSR calculations |
| Sustaining capital | ~330 | Broadly stable |
| Lease and reclamation | ~42 | Standard |
| G&A allocated | ~70 | Higher production dilutes G&A |
| Total AISC midpoint | 1,612 | Range 1,525-1,700 |
[Source: Wesdome 2026 guidance]
AISC is up 6% at the midpoint versus 2025. The main driver is cash cost (up ~13% on wage inflation and higher Kiena share of production — Kiena has been the higher-cost mine). Partially offset by higher production diluting G&A and sustaining capex. This is consistent with what every other Canadian producer is seeing. Nothing idiosyncratic to Wesdome.
The real cost story is grade, not AISC. If Eagle River holds 13+ g/t mined grade (the mill-feed guidance) and Kiena rises to 10+ g/t as Kiena Deep A Zone delivers higher-grade stopes, AISC stays roughly flat to down. If either mine drifts 1 g/t lower on mined grade, AISC rises US$150-200/oz and the beta gets ugly. Watch grade, not headline AISC.
The Doug filter screen ranked AGI #1 and AEM #3. WDO was #5. Here’s how the three stack up on the metrics that matter if you’re building a gold basket.
| Metric | AEM | AGI | WDO |
|---|---|---|---|
| Market cap | US$104.5B | US$19.4B | US3.0B||* * 2026guidedproduction(koz) * *|3, 300 − 3, 500|570 − 650|180 − 205||* * 2026guidedAISC(US/oz)** |
| Reserves (Moz P+P) | 55.4 | 15.9 | 1.2 |
| Reserve life (years at current production) | ~16 | ~25 (post Phase 3+) | ~6 |
| Reserve grade (g/t) | ~1.2 | ~1.4 | 12.67 |
| Net cash (US$B) | +2.5 | +0.4 | +0.26 |
| Forward FCF yield at $4,500 gold | ~5.5% | ~5% | ~10% |
| Operating leverage (% FCF change per 25% gold move) | ~40% | ~65% | ~94% |
| Jurisdictional mix | 75% Canada, 25% MEX/FIN/AUS | 70% Canada, 30% MEX | 100% Canada |
| Insider ownership | Low, $40M sold | Mixed | <1% |
| Dividend yield | 0.86% | Low | 0% |
| Moat source | Scale, diversification, capital discipline | Brownfield Phase 3+ growth | Grade |
AEM is the anchor. You own AEM if you want a gold allocation that compounds quietly through cycles with minimal stock-specific risk. The problem is the multiple (23x trailing P/E, 1.5-1.8x P/NAV) is already at the top of the range, insider selling is a yellow flag, and 2026 cost guidance implies ~12% AISC creep. You’d pay for it in the form of lower operating leverage to the gold price.
AGI is the growth story. Island Gold Phase 3+ is the cleanest brownfield catalyst in the group. You get mid-tier scale, North America-only, and a shaft that’s already 98% complete on the long-lead component. The main risk is execution on the mill expansion through 2028. This is the one where the growth actually does the work.
WDO is the leverage. You own WDO because you want more upside per dollar of gold rally than the other two can give you, not because you think it’s the “best” business. The trade-off is the short reserve life, the two-mine concentration, and the COO instability. The return per dollar invested at US$5,500 gold is materially higher than either AEM or AGI.
For a 4-5% gold allocation, a three-stock basket looks like:
This gives you ~4.5% total gold exposure with the bulk weighted to the quality compounder, the mid-tier growth story taking the middle slot, and the high-beta pure-play providing the call-option upside. WDO as a 1% position means a full 50% drawdown costs you 50bps of portfolio value while a 100% rally from here adds ~100bps. That asymmetry is what WDO is for at 1%.
Do not size WDO above 2% of portfolio.
Current price C$26.81 is about 97% of the 52-week high (C$27.64). The stock has been in a clean uptrend for 18 months. Chasing strength here is not ideal, but waiting for a 20%+ pullback may mean waiting for something that doesn’t come if gold keeps running.
Recommended entry approach: three-tranche scale-in.
| Tranche | Trigger | Price | Notional allocation | Cumulative |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Immediately on Pink’s go-ahead | C$26.81 | 0.35% of portfolio | 0.35% |
| 2 | Pullback to 50-day MA (~C$24.50) OR June 2026 reserve update (if not disappointing) | C$24-26 | 0.35% of portfolio | 0.70% |
| 3 | Q2 2026 earnings (August 2026) if AISC is tracking to guidance and Kiena production is stabilizing | Any price under C$30 | 0.30% of portfolio | 1.00% |
The scale-in has two functions: (1) you avoid the regret of chasing the top if there’s a pullback, and (2) you force a second and third re-examination of the thesis before you’re fully sized.
Max position size: 1.5% of portfolio. Do not let this grow beyond 1.5% even if the stock rallies. If it triples, trim to 1.5% and reinvest the proceeds in AEM or AGI. This is a basket position, not a single-name compounder.
Trim signals (reduce to 0.5% or exit):
Add signals (increase to 1.5%):
Hard exit signals (full position liquidation):
| Catalyst | Timing | Direction | Magnitude |
|---|---|---|---|
| June 2026 technical reports for Eagle River and Kiena | ~June 15-30, 2026 | Unknown | Highest magnitude catalyst of 2026. +/-15% stock reaction plausible |
| Q1 2026 earnings | Mid-May 2026 | Likely neutral to positive | Modest. Guidance is already baked in |
| Q2 2026 earnings (Kiena mid-year progress) | Mid-August 2026 | Key for Kiena ramp read | Moderate |
| Continued NCIB execution | Ongoing through Nov 2026 | Positive (signals confidence) | Low |
| Potential dividend initiation | 2027? Management said “on the table” | Positive | Low to moderate |
| Gold price | Continuous | Driven by central bank buying and ETF flows | The dominant factor |
The June 2026 technical reports are the single most important catalyst. Everything else is noise unless the tape does something wild.
From the March 2026 SEDI disclosures:
Total insider sales over last 90 days: ~11,425 shares, ~C$261,176. Compared to the C$4.05B market cap, this is dust. Not a material signal either way, but noting the asymmetry: no insider buying disclosed in the last 6 months despite the stock at 12-month highs.
[Source: Fintel WDO institutional ownership; The Markets Daily insider data]
Analyst upside is modest. My base case target of C$34 is about 12% above consensus, which is a reasonable gap for a 12-month outlook.
Wrong path 1: Gold rolls over. Central banks pause buying. ETFs sell. Trump administration reaches a currency accord with China. Gold drops to US$3,500/oz. WDO FCF drops to ~C$200M and the market rerates to 5x EV/EBITDA. Stock goes to C$19. I’d lose 29% from here. Probability: low-to-medium (20-30%).
Wrong path 2: Reserve replacement fails at Eagle River. The June 2026 technical report shows Eagle River reserves below 450koz and no credible path from 6 Central Zone to reserves inside of 18 months. The market rerates the reserve life premium and WDO drops to C$19. I’d lose 29%. Probability: low-medium (15-25%).
Wrong path 3: Kiena has a material geotechnical failure. A rock burst or ground control event takes Kiena offline for 2-4 months. 2026 production drops to 130koz. AISC spikes to US$2,000+. The stock drops to C$18-20 on the print, depending on how the insurance and recovery timeline look. Probability: low (5-15%), but the tail is real.
Wrong path 4: Combined scenarios. Any two of the above together, especially gold pullback plus a reserve miss, would take the stock below C$16. Probability: very low (<10%).
The compound bear case (expected value weighted): roughly a 20-25% downside with 35-45% probability over a 12-month hold. That’s not small. It’s the whole reason this is sized as 1-1.5% of portfolio, not 3-5%.
Own WDO in a gold basket at 1-1.5% because it gives you the highest leverage to gold in pure-Canadian jurisdiction, but do not treat it as a standalone position because the 6-year reserve life and Kiena execution risk can unwind fast if the June 2026 reserve update disappoints.
Wesdome is a TSX-listed Canadian issuer (primary listing TSX:WDO), cross-listed on OTCQX as WDOFF. The primary filing system is SEDAR+ at sedarplus.ca (the successor to SEDAR as of July 2023). Insider transactions are disclosed on SEDI at sedi.ca. Wesdome does NOT file with the US SEC because it does not have an SEC registration; the OTCQX listing operates on a Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption. Do NOT waste time searching EDGAR for WDO filings. All primary filings are on SEDAR+.
Filing equivalents: - US 10-K → Canadian Annual Information Form (AIF) + annual financial statements + MD&A - US 10-Q → Canadian Interim Financial Statements + MD&A (quarterly) - US DEF 14A → Canadian Management Information Circular (MIC) - US Form 4 → Canadian SEDI insider report - US 13D/13G → Canadian Early Warning Report (EWR) - US NT-10-K → Canadian Delayed Filing Notice
Primary document repository: - SEDAR+ search: https://www.sedarplus.ca/csa-party/records/document.html?id=WDO - Wesdome IR: https://www.wesdome.com/investors/ (note: programmatic fetch returns 403; use browser access or the IR document cache at s203.q4cdn.com)
| Period | Reported | Key Link |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | ~May 2025 | [VERIFY] |
| Q2 2025 | ~August 2025 | [VERIFY] |
| Q3 2025 | November 4, 2025 | GlobeNewswire Q3 release; Q3 MDA PDF |
| Q4 2025 + FY 2025 | March 12, 2026 (release) / March 13, 2026 (audited filing) [VERIFY exact filing date] | Junior Mining Network summary; GuruFocus earnings call transcript; Q4 2025 transcript via Investing.com |
| Q1 2026 | Expected mid-May 2026 | [VERIFY date] |
This is the key gap in Wesdome’s disclosure package right now.
Why this matters for investors: Both technical reports are more than 3 years old. Under NI 43-101 rules, a company must file an updated technical report when material changes occur. The fact that Wesdome is releasing new reports in June 2026 (regardless of the 3-year calendar) signals they have material changes to disclose — specifically around Eagle River 6 Central Zone and Kiena Presqu’île. The reports will be the primary public source of truth for mine life, reserve grade, capex requirements, and sensitivities.
This is the single highest-information-density catalyst for the stock in 2026. If you own WDO, read the technical reports the day they’re filed.
See Section 5 below for detailed insider transaction summary.
In the last 12 months, the following material changes triggered press releases and corresponding SEDAR+ filings:
| Date | Event | Link |
|---|---|---|
| June 3, 2025 | CFO Fernando Ragone departure, Raj Gill interim CFO | Press release |
| September 3, 2025 | Eagle River 6 Central Zone exploration update, 300m extension | Press release |
| September 25, 2025 | Philip C. Yee appointed permanent CFO | Press release |
| October 21, 2025 | Q3 2025 operating results + Normal Course Issuer Bid announcement | Press release; NCIB |
| December 8, 2025 | Kiena surface exploration update | Press release |
| December 15, 2025 | Eagle River 10km prospective strike extension | Press release |
| January 13, 2026 | FY2025 operating results and 2026 guidance | Press release |
| January 20, 2026 | Guy Belleau departure + Tyler Mitchelson interim COO | Press release |
| February 3, 2026 | Kiena Presqu’île Zone regulatory approval | Press release |
| ~February 2026 | Tyler Mitchelson confirmed permanent COO (post-interim) | Press release |
| March 12-13, 2026 | FY2025 audited financial results | Press release |
No material change reports related to litigation, environmental enforcement, regulatory action, or operational incidents beyond the Q3 2025 Kiena hoist shutdown (disclosed in normal course Q3 earnings, not as a separate material change).
| Metric | Q4 2024 | Q4 2025 | YoY % | FY 2024 | FY 2025 | YoY % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gold production (oz) | 49,475 [VERIFY] | 46,638 | -5.7% | 172,033 | 185,576 | +7.9% |
| Revenue (CM)|182.6|287.9|+57.7|Cashcost(US/oz sold) | 848 | 1,105 | +30.3% | ~936 | 976 | +4.3% |
| AISC (US/ozsold)|1, 373|1, 750|+27.5|Netincome(CM) | ~40 [VERIFY] | ~117 | ~+193% | 135.7 | 349 | +157% |
| EBITDA (CM)| 100[VERIFY]| 195| + 95|Freecashflow(CM) | ~50 [VERIFY] | ~97 | ~+94% | 118.6 | 278 | +134% |
| Cash balance end of period (CM)|123.1|354|+187|EPS(C basic) | ~0.27 [VERIFY] | ~0.78 | ~+190% | 0.91 | 2.32 | +155% |
[Sources: Wesdome FY2025 release via Junior Mining Network; Wesdome FY2024 release; Deep Dive Q4 2025 commentary]
Full-year AISC ran at US$1,518/oz, only 4% above 2024. But the Q4 number alone was US$1,750/oz, 28% above Q4 2024. This was not a one-quarter blow-up in the bad sense; it reflects:
Read: The Q4 print tells you how much of the 2025 cost story was “Kiena was broken.” The rest of 2025 was running much cleaner. The 2026 AISC guidance of US$1,525-1,700 assumes Kiena works and Eagle River returns to 13+ g/t. If Kiena stays broken in H1 2026, AISC gets pushed higher.
| Mine | Production (oz) | Grade (g/t) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eagle River | 113,000 | ~14.0 (full-year average mill feed) | Full-year high; Q4 ~24,000 oz |
| Kiena | ~73,000 | ~7.5 (full-year average mill feed) | Full-year low end of original guide; Q4 ~23,000 oz. Q3 hoist shutdown dragged the full-year |
| Total | 185,576 | n/a | +7.9% YoY record |
[Source: Q4 2025 transcript via Investing.com]
Note the Kiena grade. When Wesdome guided Kiena to 75-90koz for 2026, the implied mill grade at Kiena’s 1,300-2,000 tpd throughput range is 6-9 g/t, depending on what share Presqu’île contributes. That’s below the ~9 g/t 2024 Kiena average. Grade is the thing to watch.
This is the strongest balance sheet in Wesdome’s history. The cash build of C$231M in 2025 is approximately equal to trailing free cash flow (C$278M) minus dividends (zero) and NCIB spending (modest since the program only launched in October 2025). No debt raise, no equity issue, no acquisitions. Pure cash accumulation from operations.
Total 2026 capex: C$205M (before contingency)
Eagle River: C$105M - Sustaining capital: ~C$60M (underground development, mill maintenance, equipment) - Growth/exploration capex: ~C$45M (6 Central Zone drilling, mine expansion, infrastructure)
Kiena: C$80-100M [VERIFY exact split] - Sustaining capital: ~C$40-50M (mill, underground, infrastructure) - Growth/exploration capex: ~C$40-50M (Presqu’île development, Kiena Deep continued access)
Corporate and other: balance (~C$5-15M)
Exploration drilling program: C$55M standalone covering 270,000+ metres across both sites: - Eagle River: 145,000 metres (roughly 50% discovery drilling, 50% reserve replacement and zone expansion) - Kiena: 125,000 metres (more than 60% for resource growth and discoveries)
This is a record exploration program for Wesdome. The C$55M figure alone is roughly 10% of trailing revenue, which is aggressive for a producer this size and reflects management’s conviction that the drill bit is working.
[Sources: Q4 2025 earnings call transcript; 2026 guidance press release]
This is the beta framing from the company’s own mouth. See the deep-dive for the full sensitivity table.
Jeremy Hoy (Canaccord Genuity): - Asked about June 2026 technical report timing and structure. Answer: “will showcase longevity using current 2P reserves while demonstrating exploration upside.” Kiena report may come slightly later. - Asked about First Nations royalty payments at Kiena. Answer: agreements still being finalized; “making great progress.” - Asked about M&A posture. Answer: disciplined, prudent, focused on shareholder value (no deal signaled).
Don DeMarco (National Bank Financial): - Asked about Q4 low-grade development at Eagle River. Answer from interim COO Mitchelson: the low-grade Q4 development was strategic — extending mining areas to unlock stope inventory for 2026 production. 2026 grade guidance remains 13-14 g/t.
Two additional analysts on the call [VERIFY names] asked standard questions about Kiena ramp and exploration budget split. No hostile questions, no short-seller-style challenges. The tone was constructive and the stock responded positively after the call.
Per CEO Bath’s Q4 2025 call commentary:
The improvement in safety metrics is a positive signal on operational discipline under the Bath leadership cycle. The 2023 LTI frequency of 0.76 has dropped to zero in two years, which is a meaningful shift in culture. The fact that this was achieved in a record-production year (which typically correlates with more safety events, not fewer) makes it more credible.
The caveat: zero LTI in one year doesn’t mean zero risk structurally. Underground mining is inherently hazardous and the Kiena Deep operation carries elevated geotechnical risk. Maintaining zero LTI over multiple years is the real test.
This is a non-trivial management change and the user specifically asked about the backstory. Here’s what the public record shows.
A 16-month COO tenure is short. The overlap with the Q3 2025 operational issues at Kiena is hard to ignore. The public record does not connect Belleau’s departure to the Kiena hoist shutdown, and Wesdome’s disclosure was careful not to characterize it either way. But the timing tells you this was almost certainly an operational performance issue, not a personal or health-related departure. CEO Bath had recruited Belleau in 2024 specifically to drive the operational turnaround at Kiena; the fact that he’s gone 16 months later, right after Kiena caused a guidance revision, suggests Bath made a change when execution didn’t match expectations.
Senior Vice President, Copper Growth at Teck Resources (2022-2025). At Teck, Mitchelson led the development of Teck’s copper and zinc growth portfolio. This included oversight of QB2 and other major development projects. Teck’s copper division is a US$20B+ revenue business.
Earlier senior operating roles: - Chief Executive Officer, Metallurgical Coal and Group Head of Integration / Business Planning, Anglo American. Ran Anglo’s met coal business globally, managing multi-billion-dollar revenue and multiple mine operations. - President and Chief Executive Officer, Royal Nickel Corporation. Led the development-stage nickel project. - Senior positions at Vale Inco Limited and Inco Limited earlier in his career. Inco was one of the largest nickel mining operations in the world.
Education: Bachelor of Commerce (Honours), University of Manitoba. Chartered Accountant, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Manitoba.
Mitchelson is a materially stronger COO hire than Belleau was, on paper. Teck SVP Copper Growth is a senior executive role at a multi-commodity major. Anglo American CEO of Metallurgical Coal is a big-ticket operating seat. He’s worked in multiple commodity cycles, multiple jurisdictions, and multiple underground and open-pit environments. The fact that he took an interim role and then was converted to permanent quickly suggests either Bath needed him in fast or Mitchelson saw enough upside at Wesdome to commit. Either way, this is an upgrade to the operating bench.
However: He’s joining a company where the previous COO just left under cloudy circumstances, the Kiena operation has known execution issues, and the June 2026 technical report is the next high-stakes disclosure. His first 90 days in the permanent role overlap with the busiest disclosure window of the year. He’ll be on the Q1 2026 earnings call in May 2026 and that will be the first real chance to hear him speak to investors directly.
What to watch: - Q1 2026 call tone and content from Mitchelson. Does he give clear operational updates and specific numbers? Or generalities? - Kiena Q1 2026 production. Does it stabilize above 20koz with grade improving? Or more of the same? - Mitchelson’s compensation package. Look for the 2026 MIC to see the structure — RSUs, performance stock units, cash bonus targets. A package heavily weighted to operational metrics (AISC, production, safety) would be a positive signal.
[Sources: Tyler Mitchelson COO appointment via INN; Senior management update via INN; Guy Belleau COO appointment September 2024]
Aggregated from SEDI-derived secondary sources. Full SEDI pull requires manual login [VERIFY complete record via SEDI].
| Date | Insider | Role | Action | Shares | Price (C)|Value(C) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 18, 2024 | Anthea Bath | CEO | BUY | 4,250 | ~C$11.83 | ~C$50,278 |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Anthea Bath | CEO | SELL | 4,100 | 22.86 | 93,726 |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Rajbir Gill | SVP Corp Dev | SELL | 1,829 | 22.86 | 41,810 |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Ronald J. Lawrence | [VERIFY role] | SELL | 1,557 | 22.86 | 35,593 |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Robert Kallio | [VERIFY role] | SELL | 878 | 22.86 | 20,071 |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Joanna Miller | [VERIFY role] | SELL | 621 | 22.86 | 14,196 |
| Totals | 13,235 net sold | ~$155K net sold |
[Sources: Daily Political insider summary March 26, 2026; Markets Daily insider summary March 25, 2026; Anthea Bath GuruFocus profile]
The good. Bath bought 4,250 shares with her own money in November 2024 at ~C$11.83. That is a real open-market purchase by a CEO who had been in the seat for 16 months at that point. It was modest in dollar terms (~C$50K) but it was voluntary and she was using her own capital. That counts as a positive skin-in-the-game signal.
The meh. The March 25, 2026 cluster of sales was small (combined ~C$205K across 5 insiders). All at the same price (C$22.86), which strongly suggests this was coordinated execution during a post-earnings window, probably at least partially for tax purposes related to RSU vesting. It’s not a pattern of concentrated personal selling.
The concerning. No insider buying in the 18-month period leading up to April 2026 despite the stock trading at 12-month highs. Bath’s own November 2024 purchase was followed by a sale 16 months later (net position: still up 150 shares, but the signal direction flipped). When the stock was at C$12 in late 2024, insiders weren’t buying in size. When the stock hit C$25-27 in early 2026, they were selling small amounts. That’s the opposite of what you’d want to see from a management team with conviction.
Aggregate insider ownership remains under 1% of shares outstanding. This is low for a small-cap producer. The dominant counter-signal is that Bath was only appointed CEO in July 2023 and has not had time to accumulate a substantial position through organic comp vesting.
Verdict: neutral-to-yellow. Not a red flag. Not a green flag. The signal from insiders is that nobody is making big directional bets on the stock from their personal balance sheets. For a basket position, this is fine. For a concentrated single-name position, it would be a meaningful yellow flag.
The 2025 Management Information Circular was filed April 16, 2025 and is available at Wesdome IR 2025 circular PDF. All items below are either pulled from public summaries of that document or flagged [VERIFY] for direct MIC review.
| Name | Role | Independent? | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Warwick Morley-Jepson | Chair | Yes | Since 2019 | Former COO of Kinross Gold and Ivanhoe Mines; served as interim CEO Jan-June 2023 before recruiting Bath |
| Anthea Bath | President & CEO, Director | No | Since July 2023 | 25+ years mining; ex-Ero Copper COO |
| Philip C. Yee | Director (and now CFO) | No (post-CFO appointment) | Director since October 2024, CFO since September 29, 2025 | Moved from independent director to CFO; was audit committee chair before transition |
| Brian Skanderbeg | Director | Yes [VERIFY] | Multi-year | Founding CEO of GFG Resources |
| Nadine Miller | Director | Yes [VERIFY] | Multi-year | Mining sector director |
| Charles Main | Director | Yes [VERIFY] | Long-tenured | Canadian mining director |
| Bill Washington | Director | Yes [VERIFY] | Multi-year | Mining industry director |
| [Additional directors] | [VERIFY full board size — 2025 circular should list all elected] |
Observations: - Board size is approximately 7-8 members [VERIFY from 2025 MIC]. - Independence ratio appears to be roughly 5-6 independent out of 7-8, above the TSX 50% minimum. - Philip Yee’s transition from independent director to CFO is a governance item to note. Yee was recruited as an independent director in October 2024 (including audit committee chair), then transitioned to CFO in September 2025. He resigned as audit committee chair upon accepting the CFO role. This is unusual but not disqualifying — the fact that the board felt comfortable promoting an existing director to CFO suggests strong relationship, but it removes an independent voice from the audit committee and is worth flagging. [VERIFY 2025 MIC for disclosure of this transition]
Key structure per prior disclosures and industry norms for a Canadian intermediate producer: - Base salary: CEO typically C$450-550K, CFO C$350-400K, COO C$400-450K at Wesdome’s scale - Short-term incentive (cash bonus): target 100% of base, performance-linked to production, AISC, safety, and exploration metrics - Long-term incentive (equity): RSUs, PSUs, and stock options. PSUs typically tied to 3-year TSR vs peer group. - Total direct comp (CEO): likely C$2.5-3.5M [VERIFY from 2025 MIC]
The 2025 MIC Say-on-Pay advisory vote passed with strong support at the May 27, 2025 AGM (63.99% of outstanding shares voted, all matters approved). No indication of shareholder protest on pay.
Per governance best practices and prior disclosures: - Audit Committee: Chaired by independent director. Yee was chair until September 2025; successor [VERIFY] - Compensation Committee: Independent directors - Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee: Independent directors - Health, Safety, Environment and Sustainability Committee: Common at TSX-listed miners
[VERIFY complete committee composition and charters from 2025 MIC]
No material related-party transactions disclosed in public summaries of the 2025 MIC. Standard director and officer indemnification, no unusual lease arrangements, no IP licensing to insider entities, no material consulting fees paid to directors beyond standard retainers. [VERIFY via 2025 MIC Item 13 equivalent]
The governance picture is clean but not exceptional. The board is experienced, the Chair has proper industry credentials, the CEO was recruited through a genuine search process, and no red flags are visible in the public record. The Philip Yee director-to-CFO transition is an eyebrow-raiser but not disqualifying. The low insider ownership is the soft spot. Overall: Green with a yellow flag on insider alignment.
Per user request: any geotechnical or operational incidents disclosed in the last 90 days (roughly early January 2026 to early April 2026).
The Q4 2025 earnings call (March 12, 2026) explicitly said: zero lost-time incidents for FY 2025, 60% improvement in TRIFR. Both mines were operating normally as of the Q4 release.
Translation for investors: the last 90 days show a clean operational slate. No material disclosures suggest that the Kiena hoist shutdown recurred or that new geotechnical issues have emerged at either mine. The next data point comes with Q1 2026 results in mid-May 2026.