Mode: Full investment write-up, new
position research. Builds on the existing profile at
~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wiki/AGI/AGI.md (2026-04-07) and the
no-Africa screen at
~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wiki/gold-no-africa-screen.md
(2026-04-07). Companion filings review at
`~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wi…
Mode: Full investment write-up, new position research. Builds on the existing profile at
~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wiki/AGI/AGI.md(2026-04-07) and the no-Africa screen at~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wiki/gold-no-africa-screen.md(2026-04-07). Companion filings review at~/Dropbox/Wafflebun/KB/wiki/AGI/AGI-filings.md.
Alamos is the cleanest growth-at-a-reasonable-price setup in mid-tier gold: a 545koz/yr producer with a fully sanctioned, 98%-de-risked brownfield expansion that re-prices it as a 900koz+/yr producer by 2028 at $1,025/oz mine-site AISC, funded entirely from operating cash flow, in pure North America, with the best reserve-growth record in the peer group.
Conviction is high because the catalyst is not a hope, it is infrastructure. The Phase 3+ shaft is sunk to 1,350 metres of 1,379 metres planned. The headframe, hoist house, bin house, and paste plant are in late-stage commissioning. 91% of the total growth-capital commitment has already been spent. There is no “what if the permit lands” question, no “what if the deposit is real” question, no “what if they can’t finance it” question. The remaining work is executing on a brownfield mill expansion in Ontario that Alamos already owns and operates, with equipment already on order. That is the lowest-risk form of growth capex in the sector.
The only real risk is the Magino mill expansion from 12,400 tpd to 20,000 tpd, which runs through 2027 into Q1 2028. Worth watching, not a deal-breaker.
Target derivation explained in Section 11.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Stock price (NYSE) | ~$46.31 |
| Stock price (TSX) | ~C$64.45 |
| Market cap | ~$19.4B USD |
| Enterprise value | ~$19.0B |
| Net cash | +$423M ($623M cash / $200M debt) |
| 2025 production | 545,400 oz |
| 2025 AISC | $1,524/oz |
| 2025 FCF | $351.7M (record) |
| 2025 net earnings | $885.8M ($2.11/share) — includes non-cash |
| 2025 adjusted net earnings | $587.1M ($1.40/share) |
| P/E (TTM, reported) | ~22x |
| P/E (TTM, adjusted) | ~33x |
| FCF yield (2025, TTM) | ~1.8% |
| 52-week range | C$36-C$75.78 |
Three reasons to own AGI today, in order of importance.
1. Island Gold District Phase 3+ is 98% done on the hard part. The shaft is the single biggest execution risk in any underground expansion. It is essentially sunk. First ore through the new shaft is Q4 2026. Everything else downstream is mill work, grid tie-in, and ramp, all of which Alamos has done before on similar scales. The market is still giving Alamos mid-tier producer multiples while the path to near-senior production is already funded and in motion.
2. The NI 43-101 filing de-risks the long-term numbers. Alamos filed the Island Gold District Expansion technical report on March 20, 2026. This is the formal, independently-reviewed document that backs up the $1,025/oz AISC, the 534koz average production, and the $12.2B NPV at $4,500 gold. Before March 20, that was a management press release. After March 20, it is a qualified-person-signed technical report filed on SEDAR+ and EDGAR, which is a much higher standard of disclosure. Reserves are now 8.3 Moz at 2.01 g/t across the combined district.
3. The 2025 guidance miss is a gift. December 2025 snowstorms in Ontario and a premature SAG mill liner replacement at Magino drove production 35kz below the low end of original guidance. The stock sold off on the Q4 print but the long-term plan was unchanged. The miss was weather and a mechanical issue, not a reserve problem or a development setback. Anyone who thinks the 2025 weather impairs the 2028 production profile is not reading the asset base correctly.
The second-order reason to own AGI: the entire peer group has a problem. Agnico Eagle is at 3.5Moz and guiding flat through 2028 with 10-12% AISC creep. Kinross and B2Gold have Africa exposure. Endeavour is Africa pure-play. Eldorado has two greenfield ramps in the same year and Türkiye exposure. Lundin Gold is single-asset Ecuador. Wesdome is 6-year reserve life. If you want growth, safe jurisdiction, and a clean balance sheet, AGI is functionally the only name.
This is the entire thesis. I will walk through it carefully.
Alamos owns two adjacent gold mines in northern Ontario, roughly 3 km apart: Island Gold (high-grade underground, 10.61 g/t reserve grade) and Magino (lower-grade open pit acquired from Argonaut Gold in July 2024 for ~$325M enterprise value). Both had their own mills. The plan: expand the Magino mill from 12,400 tpd to 20,000 tpd, shut the Island Gold mill in 2028, feed everything through Magino, and concurrently finish a deep shaft at Island Gold that lets underground mining rates hit 3,000 tpd at much lower hoisting cost.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Average annual production (first 10 years, 2028-2037) | 534,000 oz |
| Mine life | 19 years |
| Reserves (Dec 31 2025) | 8.3 Moz at 2.01 g/t |
| Tonnes of reserve | 128.2 Mt |
| Underground mining rate (2029+) | 3,000 tpd |
| Open pit mining rate | 17,000 tpd of ore |
| Mill capacity | 20,000 tpd |
| Total cash cost (10-year avg) | $682/oz |
| Mine-site AISC (10-year avg) | $1,025/oz |
| Capital per oz sold (LOM) | $393/oz |
Source: Feb 4 2026 Island Gold District Expansion release; NI 43-101 technical report filed March 20, 2026.
| Bucket | Amount |
|---|---|
| Growth capital, expansion only | $542M |
| Growth capital incl. Phase 3+ | $704M |
| Sustaining capital (life-of-mine) | $2,342M |
| Total life-of-mine capital | $3,046M |
This is the most important table in the deep dive. All figures from the Feb 4 2026 press release and confirmed in the March 20 NI 43-101 technical report.
| Gold price ($/oz) | After-tax NPV (5%) | After-tax IRR |
|---|---|---|
| $2,800 | $6.05B | 43% |
| $3,200 (base case) | $8.16B | 53% |
| $3,600 | $8.96B | 56% |
| $4,000 | $10.42B | 62% |
| $4,500 | $12.24B | 69% |
| $5,000 | $14.06B | 75% |
| $5,500 | $15.88B | 81% |
Two things to notice.
First: the base case is $3,200/oz, not $4,500/oz. The headlines from the screen and the press got stuck on the $12.2B / 69% IRR number because it is the flashiest. But Alamos’s own base case is $3,200/oz, which is still ~$100 below today’s spot. At $3,200 the project still generates an $8.16B NPV and a 53% after-tax IRR. That is a massive number on a growth capex bill of $704M.
Second: the sensitivity is flatter than you would expect because AISC is fixed at $1,025/oz. Every incremental dollar of gold price drops almost directly to the bottom line. At $3,200 gold vs $1,025 AISC that is $2,175/oz of cash margin. At $4,500 gold that is $3,475/oz, or 60% more margin. So gold moving from $3,200 to $4,500 (+40%) drives NPV from $8.2B to $12.2B (+50%). The project is levered to gold price but in a linear, not exponential, way.
This is what Pink should focus on. The bear case is gold drops back from current $3,300-3,400 to $3,000 or $2,500.
The break-even gold price where the Island Gold District project stops being NPV-positive is somewhere below $1,200/oz. The project does not need $4,500 gold to work. It needs gold to not collapse by half.
| Item | Status as of Q4 2025 |
|---|---|
| Total budget | $835M |
| Spent | $694M (83%) |
| Remaining | $141M (largely 2026) |
| Shaft depth | 1,350m of 1,379m (98%) |
| Headframe, hoist, bin | In late commissioning |
| Paste plant | In late commissioning |
| Grid power tie-in | End of 2026 |
| First ore through new shaft | Q4 2026 |
| Shaft commissioning complete | Q4 2026 |
| Ramp to 3,000 tpd underground | 2029 |
Source: Q4 2025 earnings release (Feb 18, 2026).
The single most important milestone for AGI in 2026 is “first ore skipping from the new shaft in Q4 2026.” If Alamos hits that on time, the Phase 3+ part of the expansion is done and the remaining risk migrates entirely to the Magino mill expansion.
Everyone is focused on Phase 3+ because it is the biggest capex line item. The genuine execution risk is the Magino mill expansion.
The Magino mill was commissioned by Argonaut Gold in 2023, ran into working capital problems, and was sold to Alamos in July 2024 as part of the distressed Argonaut acquisition. In Q4 2025 it averaged 8,625 tpd, below the 10,000 tpd guidance, because of weather disruption and an earlier-than-planned SAG mill discharge liner replacement. Management expects it to reach 10,000 tpd by Q3 2026 once grid power connects in late 2026.
The expansion plan takes it from 12,400 tpd nameplate (original design) to 20,000 tpd by Q1 2028. That is roughly a 60% increase in throughput. The work includes:
Three reasons Magino is harder than the Phase 3+ shaft.
Integration risk. Two ore bodies, one mill. The ore from Island Gold underground is 10.61 g/t and sulphide-hosted. The ore from Magino is 0.86 g/t and oxide-ish. Blending them in the same grinding and flotation circuit requires careful metallurgical work. If recoveries disappoint on either ore type, the combined district economics suffer.
Mill reliability track record. The Q4 2025 performance (8,625 tpd vs 10,000 tpd guidance) is a warning. SAG mill liners wearing faster than expected is a common first-year-of-operation issue but it needs to stop. Going from 8,625 tpd to 20,000 tpd in three years is aggressive even without a liner problem.
Grid power tie-in. The mill is still running on diesel. Grid power connection is scheduled for late 2026. Delays here don’t kill the expansion but they compress margins and extend the execution window.
For the next 6 quarters Pink should watch:
| Quarter | Milestone | Importance |
|---|---|---|
| Q2 2026 | Magino running at 10,000 tpd sustained | Medium |
| Q3 2026 | First ore through new Phase 3+ shaft (initial commissioning) | High |
| Q4 2026 | Grid power tie-in at Magino | Medium |
| Q4 2026 | Phase 3+ shaft formally commissioned | Critical |
| H1 2027 | Initial long-lead mill equipment for 20,000 tpd arrives on site | Medium |
| H2 2027 | Magino mill expansion mechanical completion | High |
| Q1 2028 | 20,000 tpd nameplate achieved | Critical |
If Q4 2026 slips (first ore through new shaft), the 2028 production ramp slips by whatever that delay is and the stock takes a 10-15% hit. If Q1 2028 slips (20,000 tpd nameplate), the impact is smaller because the initial 287koz Phase 3+ benefit from Island Gold alone is already flowing by then.
This is the headline framework Alamos issued at the Feb 4 2026 Investor Day. Full table from the Three-Year Operating Guidance release.
| Mine | 2026 (koz) | 2027 (koz) | 2028 (koz) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Island Gold District | 290-330 | 380-420 | 470-510 |
| Young-Davidson | 155-175 | 155-175 | 155-175 |
| Mulatos District | 125-145 | 115-135 | 130-150 |
| Total | 570-650 | 650-730 | 755-835 |
| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total cash costs ($/oz) | $1,020-1,120 | $825-925 | 775 − 875||AISC(/oz) |
| Category | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sustaining capital | $193-220 | $235-255 | $210-235 |
| Growth capital (operating) | $140-155 | $40-60 | $30-45 |
| Island Gold District expansion | $240-260 | $130-145 | $80-90 |
| Lynn Lake | $140-160 | $380-410 | $290-310 |
| Total | $850-940 | $800-890 | $610-680 |
Source: Three-Year Operating Guidance, Feb 4 2026
From 2025 actual (545koz, $1,524 AISC) to 2028 midpoint guidance (795koz, $1,250 AISC):
The official long-term guidance, from the same Feb 4 release: “approximately one million ounces per year by 2030” driven by Island Gold District ramp plus Lynn Lake first gold in 1H 2029.
The Lynn Lake addition alone is 186koz/yr at $829/oz mine-site AISC over 25 years. Add that to a 2028 base of 800koz and you get close to 990koz/yr by 2030 with blended AISC below $1,150/oz.
Let me run the math at three gold prices. Assumes 2028 production of 800koz at $1,250 AISC (midpoint of guide), $80M sustaining capex and $200M total capex in 2028 (per guidance).
| Gold price | 2028 revenue | AISC margin | EBITDA approx | FCF approx |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $2,500/oz | $2.00B | $1,250/oz | $1.00B | ~$700M |
| $3,200/oz | $2.56B | $1,950/oz | $1.56B | ~$1.1B |
| $3,500/oz | $2.80B | $2,250/oz | $1.80B | ~$1.25B |
| $4,000/oz | $3.20B | $2,750/oz | $2.20B | ~$1.55B |
| $4,500/oz | $3.60B | $3,250/oz | $2.60B | ~$1.85B |
At today’s ~$3,400 gold, 2028 FCF runs $1.1-1.2B on a $19B market cap. That is a 6% FCF yield on 2028. And from 2029 on, capex collapses and FCF yield jumps to 8-10% at flat gold. That is what the stock is actually paying for.
This is the single most important analytical table in the deep dive. I am framing it as what an investor needs to believe about gold prices to make the AGI thesis work.
Assumes: 800koz production, $1,250 AISC, ~$150M non-mine corporate and interest. Share count 420M.
| Gold price | 2028 FCF | 2028 FCF/share | Implied price at 8% FCF yield | Implied price at 6% FCF yield | Implied price at 4% FCF yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $2,500 | $700M | $1.67 | $20.83 | $27.78 | $41.67 |
| $3,000 | $970M | $2.31 | $28.87 | $38.50 | $57.74 |
| $3,200 | $1,100M | $2.62 | $32.74 | $43.65 | $65.48 |
| $3,500 | $1,250M | $2.98 | $37.20 | $49.60 | $74.40 |
| $4,000 | $1,550M | $3.69 | $46.13 | $61.51 | $92.26 |
| $4,500 | $1,850M | $4.40 | $55.06 | $73.41 | $110.12 |
Read this table as follows.
At today’s gold price ($3,300-3,400/oz) and a 6% FCF yield (fair for a near-senior producer with 25-year reserve life), AGI is worth roughly $45-50 in 2028, discounted back to today. That is the current price, give or take. So the stock is currently priced for gold to stay flat.
At $3,500 gold (modest upside from today) and 6% FCF yield, AGI is worth $50. At 4% FCF yield (rare for a gold name but not unheard of in strong rally years) it is worth $75.
At $3,000 gold (pullback scenario) and 6% FCF yield, AGI is worth $38-40. That is a ~15% downside to the current price. Survivable.
The thesis breaks only if gold falls below $2,500/oz and stays there. At $2,500 gold and 6% FCF yield, AGI is worth $28 (40% downside). That would require a major risk-off reversal. Possible but not likely from current macro conditions.
The entire sensitivity table is framed around what’s already achievable. AGI does not need a gold price bailout. The Island Gold District project works at $2,800 gold. The consolidated company generates positive FCF at $2,500 gold. The thesis is not “buy gold” it is “buy the cheapest way to get 46% production growth at current or even lower gold prices.”
Assumptions: - Phase 3+ shaft commissioned on time in Q4 2026 - Magino mill expansion hits 20,000 tpd by Q1 2028 on time and on budget - 2028 production lands near top of guidance (820-835koz) with AISC near bottom ($1,200) - Gold averages $3,800-4,200 through 2026-2028 - Lynn Lake restarts as planned and stays on track for 1H 2029 first gold - Multiple expansion from mid-tier (1.2x P/NAV) to near-senior (1.5x P/NAV) as production clears 800koz
2028 FCF lands at ~$1.5B. At 6% FCF yield the stock is $60. At 4% FCF yield it is $90. The midpoint bull target is $75-80 by end-2027 and $85-90 by end-2028.
What has to go right: Phase 3+ on time, Magino mill on time, no gold price reversal, Lynn Lake on track, no succession event, no community/permitting surprise.
Assumptions: - Phase 3+ slips from Q4 2026 to Q2 2027 (6-month delay in first ore) - Magino mill expansion slips from Q1 2028 to Q4 2028 - 2028 production lands 10% below low-end guidance (680koz) - Gold corrects from $3,400 back to $2,700 - Lynn Lake construction hits a cost overrun of 30-40% - McCluskey succession event creates headline pressure
2028 FCF lands at $500-600M. At a stressed 8-9% FCF yield the stock is $15-18. At a more normal 6% FCF yield it is $25-30. Pragmatic bear target: $28-32.
What has to go wrong: At least two of (Phase 3+ slip, Magino ramp fail, gold selloff, Lynn Lake overrun, succession). Single-issue downside is more like $40.
Assigning probabilities: - Bull case (40% probability) × $82 target = $32.80 - Base case (45% probability) × $60 target = $27.00 - Bear case (15% probability) × $30 target = $4.50
Probability-weighted target: ~$64, which is ~40% upside from current $46. Matches the street’s C$77-80 consensus target on the TSX (~US$55-58 equivalent).
The alternative in the screen is Agnico Eagle. They are both quality Canadian names. They are different bets. Here is the side-by-side.
| Metric | AEM | AGI |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 production | 3,485 koz (actual) | 545 koz |
| 2026 guide midpoint | 3.4 Moz | 610 koz |
| 2028 guide midpoint | 3.4 Moz (flat) | 795 koz |
| Production growth (2025→2028) | ~0% | +46% |
| 2025 AISC | $1,517 (Q4) | $1,524 |
| 2026 AISC midpoint | $1,475 | $1,550 |
| 2028 AISC direction | rising 3-5% | falling 18% |
| Market cap | $104.5B | $19.4B |
| P/NAV (rough) | 1.5-1.8x | 1.2-1.4x |
| Dividend yield | 0.86% | 0.2% |
| 2025 capital returned | $1.4B | $81M |
| Insider buying (12mo) | $0 | modest/neutral |
| Insider selling (12mo) | $40M | negligible |
| 2025 FCF | $4.4B | $352M |
| FCF yield | 4.2% | 1.8% |
| Africa exposure | None | None |
AEM is a cash-return story. At 3.5Moz steady-state, AEM’s job is to generate $4.5-5B of FCF per year, return $1.5-2B to shareholders, and maintain its asset base. It is a quality dividend growth machine. Multiple expansion is not really on the table (1.5-1.8x P/NAV is already senior-tier). Returns come from the dividend plus gold price beta.
AGI is a growth story. At 545koz growing to 800-900koz, AGI’s job is to execute the brownfield expansion, reinvest cash into Phase 3+ and Lynn Lake, and reprice from mid-tier (1.2x P/NAV) to near-senior (1.5x P/NAV). Returns come from production growth, cost reduction, multiple expansion, and gold price beta.
Four reasons.
Production growth. AGI has it. AEM does not. In a sector where most names are struggling to replace depletion, a 46% production ramp through a funded brownfield expansion is rare and valuable.
Cost trajectory. AGI’s AISC is going down from $1,524 in 2025 to $1,200-1,300 in 2028. AEM’s AISC is going up from $1,339 in 2025 to $1,475-1,500 in 2026 and stays there. Cost inflation is a feature of every major producer right now except the ones running down the cost curve on new low-cost tonnes. AGI is one of the very few.
Valuation spread. AEM trades at 23.5x trailing P/E, AGI at 22x. But AGI is about to grow earnings 46% over three years, AEM is not. Paying a similar multiple for a materially better growth profile is exactly the GARP setup.
Insider signal. AEM insiders sold $40M over 12 months with zero buying. AGI insider activity is neutral. Net, AGI insiders are not running. AEM insiders clearly are trimming into the run.
Scale, capital returns, and a 16-year reserve life of diversified producing assets. AEM is 11 mines in 4 countries. AGI is essentially 3 mines in 2 countries, with one of those 3 mines being the whole story. If a single asset has a problem at AGI, it matters more. AEM is harder to break.
AEM is also running a $1.4B/yr capital return program (dividends plus buybacks), which is more than AGI’s entire free cash flow. If your thesis is “I want a gold producer that pays me every quarter,” AEM wins. If your thesis is “I want to own a near-senior gold producer in 2028 at today’s mid-tier price,” AGI wins.
A reasonable structure is AEM 2% + AGI 2-3%. AEM as the quality core, AGI as the higher-conviction growth satellite. But if Pink can only pick one at this moment in the cycle, pick AGI. The growth profile plus the already-de-risked catalyst plus the multiple expansion optionality is a better risk/reward right now than paying 1.7x P/NAV for a flat-production senior.
Current price ~$46 is above the pre-guidance trading range but below the all-time high of ~C$75 (~US$54). The stock has already rallied on the Feb 4 Investor Day sanction and the Feb 18 Q4 results. Some enthusiasm is priced in.
My recommendation is scale-in rather than single-entry. Three tranches.
| Tranche | Trigger | Price (USD) | Allocation | Size of total position |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Start a position immediately at current price | $45-48 | 40% | 1.2% of portfolio |
| 2 | Scale on any 8-10% pullback (below $42) | $40-42 | 30% | 0.9% of portfolio |
| 3 | Final tranche on a 15%+ pullback (below $38) OR confirmation of Phase 3+ first ore | $35-38 OR on catalyst | 30% | 0.9% of portfolio |
Total target position: 3% of portfolio at full size.
If the stock never pulls back and simply grinds higher, you own Tranche 1 (1.2% starter) through the Phase 3+ commissioning in Q4 2026, and you add at confirmation instead. That is a fine outcome.
Three reasons to cap at 3%:
Single-asset concentration inside AGI. Island Gold District is ~60% of 2028 NAV. A geotechnical event at one specific ore body in Ontario can take out most of the thesis. Position size reflects correlated risk inside the company.
Correlation to gold. AGI is a leveraged call on gold price. A 10% move in gold is a 25-30% move in FCF and a 15-20% move in the stock. You do not want too much portfolio beta to one commodity.
CEO succession tail risk. McCluskey is in his 60s. There is no public successor. A transition event, orderly or otherwise, is a 10-15% stock move. That is the definition of an uncompensated risk, so size accordingly.
If Pink wants gold exposure beyond AGI, the complement is Franco-Nevada (FNV) — the royalty model strips operational risk and compounds steadily. A 2% FNV + 2.5-3% AGI basket gives you both the cash machine and the growth story in gold without concentrating on any single mine.
AEM as a third leg (1.5-2%) makes the basket more diversified but it is optional. AEM is priced for perfection right now and the insider signal is bad.
Avoid African producers. Avoid single-asset names in Ecuador. Avoid Türkiye exposure.
Sell AGI if any of the following happens:
Hard exits (sell immediately):
Phase 3+ slips by more than one quarter. If first ore through the new shaft is not demonstrated by end of Q1 2027, the thesis is damaged enough to reassess. Sell or trim by half.
Material reserve impairment at Island Gold. If the Island Gold reserve grade drops below 8 g/t in the next year-end update, or if reserves fall materially below 5 Moz, the whole district economics change.
McCluskey departs under pressure. An orderly retirement with a named successor is fine. A departure accompanied by an earnings restatement, accounting issue, or disputed resignation is a full exit.
Related-party transaction surfaces. The Management DD work in the profile showed a clean setup. If a new proxy surfaces consulting payments to insider-controlled entities, asset migration to affiliates, or anything Nongaap-pattern, sell 100% immediately.
Gold breaks $2,200/oz and holds for 30+ days. That is the technical price that would require a reassessment of the entire 2028 thesis. Not a collapse, but the margin of safety erodes.
Soft exits (trim, reassess):
Hold through:
Method: Forward 2027E FCF multiple.
The 12-month target does not pay for 2027 FCF alone because capex is at peak. Apply a blended multiple to 2027 EBITDA and 2028 FCF.
Blended 12-month target: $60 (25% upside from $48). Supports starting a position today.
Method: 2028E FCF × multiple at mature production.
2028 base case target at $3,500 gold: $75-85. This is a 2-year holding-period return of ~65-85% assuming entry near current levels.
| Metric | FY2023A | FY2024A | FY2025A | FY2026E | FY2027E | FY2028E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production (koz) | 529 | 567 | 545.4 | 610 | 690 | 795 |
| Realized gold ($/oz) | ~$1,950 [VERIFY] | ~$2,400 [VERIFY] | $3,372 | $3,400 | $3,400 | 3, 400||Revenue(M) |
| AISC ($/oz) | $1,160 | $1,281 | $1,524 | $1,550 | $1,375 | $1,250 |
| Cash margin/oz | $790 | $1,119 | $1,848 | $1,850 | $2,025 | 2, 150||EBITDA(M) |
| Adj EPS | ~$0.60 | ~$0.83 | $1.40 | ~$1.58 | ~$2.00 | ~$2.47 |
| Metric | FY2023A | FY2024A | FY2025A | FY2026E | FY2027E | FY2028E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OCF (M)|519| 663[VERIFY]|795| 950| 1, 150| 1, 400||Capex(M) | ~395 | ~391 | 444 | 895 | 845 | 645 |
| FCF ($M) | 124 | 272 | 352 | ~55 | ~305 | ~755 | | FCF margin % | 12% | 20% | 20% | ~3% | ~13% | ~28% | | Net cash ($M) | ~0 | ~75 | 423 | ~475 | ~780 | ~1,535 |
| Net debt/EBITDA | ~0x | (0.1)x | (0.4)x | (0.4)x | (0.5)x | (0.9)x |
Critical observation: 2026 is the FCF trough year. Capex peaks at $895M while production is still only 610koz. That is why the stock is trading at only ~$46 right now. The market sees trough FCF in 2026 and extrapolates. The upside is in understanding that 2026 trough is temporary, and by 2028 FCF has returned to $750M+ (2x the 2025 record) with higher production and declining capex.
This FCF trough in 2026 is actually a buy signal. It is the classic “growth capex depresses current FCF, which depresses the stock, which makes the forward look compelling” setup that GARP investors live for.
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigant | Can close? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 3+ shaft delay | Low | High (2028 ramp slip) | 98% shaft complete, experienced EPC | Yes — closes Q4 2026 |
| Magino mill integration failure | Medium | Medium-high | Brownfield, management track record | Partial — closes Q1 2028 |
| Gold price reversal to <$2,500 | Medium | High (FCF compression) | $423M net cash, low-cost base | Structural |
| McCluskey succession event | Medium | Medium (headline risk) | Strong COO, established board, Prichard chair | Partial — via formal succession plan |
| Lynn Lake capex overrun | Medium-high | Medium (affects 2029+) | Delayed start avoided 2025 wildfire costs | Partial |
| Mexican country risk (Mulatos) | Low-Medium | Low (mix declining) | Long-run asset, community relations | Structural but fades |
| Labor/union action at YD or Island Gold | Medium | Medium | Established CBAs, strong community ties | Structural |
| Catastrophic geotechnical event | Low | High | Standard insurance, operational protocols | No |
Magino mill integration failure. This is the one that keeps me up. Phase 3+ is 98% done, Lynn Lake is still years away, gold price is macro, McCluskey is a known unknown. But the Magino mill expansion is both execution-dependent and critical to the 2028 thesis. If Magino can’t reliably run at 20,000 tpd on blended Island Gold + open-pit ore, the $1,025/oz AISC target fails and the NPV falls materially.
This is not a thesis-breaking risk. It is a thesis-delaying risk. A 1-year Magino delay pushes the 2028 targets to 2029 and lops 10-15% off the share price target. Watch quarterly mill reports.
Low. Share count has grown from ~390M in 2022 to ~419M in 2025 (Argonaut deal paid in stock + normal SBC). No ATM, no shelf. Operating cash flow at current gold prices fully funds all capex and Lynn Lake. The balance sheet is the buffer, not the equity market.
McCluskey has been CEO for 22+ years. He is in his 60s. There is no named successor. This is the largest structural uncertainty at the company. Mitigants: long-tenured COO and CFO, Bay Street establishment chair (Prichard), clean governance. But if McCluskey announces retirement tomorrow with no clear heir, the stock is down 10% on the day.
Ownership is concentrated in passive index funds and dedicated gold equity specialists. Top holders: BlackRock ~8.3%, Vanguard ~3.8% [VERIFY], Van Eck (GDX/GDXJ), First Eagle Gold Fund, FMR (Fidelity). No activists. No 13D filings. No hedge fund favorites.
Analyst coverage: well-covered with a unanimous Strong Buy. Average price target C$77-80 (implies ~30% upside from current C$64). No sell ratings. No contrarian shorts.
The risk to a unanimous consensus is always the same: if Phase 3+ slips or Magino integration disappoints, the entire street is on one side of the boat and the revision cycle is painful. Entry below $42 builds in enough margin for a 15-20% street-wide downgrade.
| Date (approx) | Catalyst | Importance | Expected reaction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Late April 2026 | Q1 2026 results and operational update | High | Watch Canadian Q1 production, Phase 3+ milestone update |
| Late April 2026 | Lynn Lake construction restart confirmation | Medium | Important for 2029 timing |
| May 2026 | Annual meeting | Low | Watch for any director changes or governance disclosures |
| June-July 2026 | Summer drilling results from Island Gold District ($97M program) | Medium | Reserve additions support long-term thesis |
| August 2026 | Q2 2026 results | High | Magino mill reaching 10,000 tpd is the key datapoint |
| Date (approx) | Catalyst | Importance |
|---|---|---|
| October-November 2026 | Q3 2026 results | High |
| November 2026 | Initial dividend/NCIB update | Low |
| December 2026 | Grid power tie-in at Magino | High |
| Q4 2026 | Phase 3+ shaft commissioning; first ore through shaft | Critical |
| January 2027 | 2026 production results | High |
| February 2027 | Q4 2026 results + reserve update + 2027 guidance | Critical |
From the screen, Doug was asking for a Canadian gold producer without African exposure. AGI nails this filter on every dimension:
The closest thing to a disqualification in a Doug conversation is the CEO succession issue. It would be honest to raise that and ask whether Alamos has disclosed a succession plan (the answer so far: not publicly).
Primary company documents: - Alamos Gold Q4 & Year-End 2025 Results (Feb 18, 2026) - Three-Year Operating Guidance (Feb 4, 2026) - Island Gold District Expansion Announcement (Feb 4, 2026) - NI 43-101 Technical Report filing (March 20, 2026) - Reserves and Resources Year-End 2025 (Feb 17, 2026) - 2026 Investor Day Presentation PDF - Q4 Production Release (Jan 14, 2026) - 2025 Annual Report and 40-F filing (March 26, 2026)
Peer comparison (AEM): - Agnico Eagle Q4 2025 Results
Internal: - [[AGI]] (profile, 2026-04-07) - [[AGI-filings]] (companion filings review) - [[gold-no-africa-screen]] (peer screen, 2026-04-07) - [[gold-mine-supply-chain-primer]]
AGI is a 545koz/yr Canadian gold producer that reprices to 900koz+/yr by 2028 at $1,025/oz mine-site AISC thanks to a 98%-complete brownfield shaft and a Magino mill expansion. Base case NPV at the company’s $3,200 gold assumption is $8.2B on $704M of growth capex. Pure Canada and Mexico, $423M net cash, best reserve growth in the peer group (+32% in 2025), clean governance. The 2025 weather miss is a gift; long-term plan unchanged. Start at $46, scale on pullbacks, max 3% portfolio. Target $60 in 12 months, $75-85 by 2028 at current gold. The CEO is 22 years in and succession is the only real non-operational risk. High conviction.
Items in this deep dive that need primary-source verification: